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This Joint Applied Project examines the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 
processes, practices and lessons learned for fulfilling emerging urgent needs in the 
current Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).  It compares Army rapid acquisition 
policies and processes to the execution of a traditional Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) 
program to identify opportunities to improve the responsiveness of rapid acquisition 
programs executed by traditional program management offices. 
The project establishes a baseline and analyzes the implications of existing 
policies, processes, and practices for executing rapid acquisition programs.  It draws 
conclusions and offers recommendations for continuing improvements towards a more 
modern and responsive rapid acquisition process.  The findings indicate that the Army 
REF is adapting and evolving processes to better respond to the urgent needs of its 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Department of Defense rapid acquisition activities have developed processes and best 
practices, learned critical lessons and evolved over the last nine years in order to operate 
effectively in the current Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) environment.  As a 
result, there exists an opportunity for the greater acquisition community to leverage these 
processes, best practices, and lessons learned to improve the Urgent Materiel Release 
(UMR) process executed by traditional acquisition organizations.  The U.S. Army Rapid 
Equipping Force (REF) is a prime example of an organization that has overcome many of 
the institutional barriers and thrives within the constraints of the current policies and 
processes.  It provides an example of innovation, flexibility and responsiveness that is 
worthy of study to determine what is appropriate for emulation by other organizations. 
This project captured the Army’s current applicable rapid acquisition policies and 
the processes, best practices and lessons learned through a review of the REF Office.  It 
compared the processes and practices of the REF to the processes and practices executed 
by Joint Project Manager Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Avoidance 
(JPM NBC CA) in support of an Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) program.  The 
comparative analysis determined existing opportunities for the REF processes, best 
practices and lessons learned to improve the responsiveness of the Program Manager’s 
(PM) streamlined acquisition.  
The analysis examined the three DoD Decision Support Systems—Joint 
Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS), Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS), and Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution System (PPBES)—utilizing 
the framework established in the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
to focus the streamlined acquisition process improvement recommendations in the areas 
of Organization, Workforce, Budget, Requirements, and Acquisition.  Selected REF best 
practices and processes from these areas were compared to the execution of the 
JNBCRS2 JUON effort to identify the following implementation opportunities to 
improve and streamline the traditional acquisition processes.   
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Requirements—JCIDS 
 Create tiered categories below the ACAT III designation within JCIDS for rapid 
initiatives.  Classify the tiers according to thresholds for the estimated cost and 
urgency of the acquisition effort and designate the levels of oversight and 
validation necessary. 
 Incorporate a process similar to the REF 10-Liner to streamline and standardize 
submission process and aid in project classification. 
Acquisition—DAS 
 Develop rapid initiative specific guidance based on the REF’s METT-TC-FLARS 
process to create a streamlined, repeatable process for conducting requirements 
analysis. 
 Tailor the amount of testing and associated OA based on the urgency, technical 
maturity level and cost risk associated with the system(s) based on the tiered 
approach with more robust follow-on testing planned to confirm the effectiveness, 
suitability and survivability of the system(s).  
 Incorporate TDEs conducted by the ATEC FOA teams as a risk reduction 
measure for the tiered approach provide forward operational assessments as part 
of the robust follow-on testing. 
 Develop a standardized COP/project management system to provide situational 
awareness and visibility of projects across the three major acquisition systems 
(JCIDS, DAS, PPBES).   
Budget—PPBE 
 Establish a specific funding line for rapid acquisition projects that is not tied to 
specific ―colors‖ of money. 
 Develop funding threshold criteria that align with the tiered approach. 
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Workforce 
 Increase the number of military acquisition professionals in PM organizations and 
develop a corps of civilian employees that has experience interacting with 
operational organizations. 
 Maintain a rapid cell as a center of excellence that can advise and guide 
traditional acquisition organizations and provide training to PMs during rapid 
projects. 
 Develop a core of subject matter experts in contracting for rapid acquisition 
projects. 
Organization 
 Reduce the level of decision authority and oversight for urgent needs projects 
based on a tiered approach organized according to the associated technical 
maturity level and cost risk of the effort. 
 Incorporate LNOs from the requirements community into the PM offices to 
develop habitual relationships.  
 Increase the number of ATEC LNOs within the PMs to increase the efficiency of 
test and evaluation activities. 
 Transfer the operational contact team approach to the requirements community to 
increase responsiveness to emerging needs by reducing the lines of 
communication from the warfighter to the requirements community and increase 
efficiency for accurately capturing the information required to make informed 
decisions.  Additionally, these teams should maintain habitual relationships with 
the PMs. 
 Maintain the REF logistics group as a center of excellence for the fielding of 
urgent needs to provide guidance on the intricacies of urgent need system 
deployment to traditional PM logisticians. 
These kinds of changes to improve effectiveness and responsiveness are not 
without risk.  The problems that affect effectiveness and responsiveness have been 
identified multiple times and implementation criteria have even been defined by some; 
however, defining new processes and implementing institutional culture change in an 
organization like the DoD is extremely difficult.  The current DAS is the product of over 
50 years of evolution, and even though it has it flaws, it has produced some of the finest 
military equipment in the world; but, external factors are creating new rules of 
engagement which are forcing us to adapt quickly or be forced to fight with outdated and 
ineffective equipment and technology.  The Army rapid acquisition processes, especially 
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those of the REF, have given us a window into what can be done within the established 
laws and regulations.  Additionally, the T&E community has been transformed by the 
rapid acquisition process with smaller and earlier tests as opposed to the pass/fail 
operational test of the past.  Items are being fielded as tests are ongoing, and the results of 
that testing are being applied to the next iteration of the system to be fielded.  
The pioneering and creative processes and practices developed by the REF can be 
lasting legacies that serve the needs of the Army now and into the future if we capture 
them and take advantage of them now.  The acquisition and T&E communities have an 
opportunity to use the REF processes, practices, and lessons learned to bring meaningful 
change to our rapid acquisition system and position us to maintain our dominance on the 
battlefields of the future.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional defense acquisition processes, which include individual 
Services’ acquisition processes, are designed primarily for major weapon 
systems costing billions of dollars in research, development, test and 
evaluation, as well as production, manufacturing, fielding and 
sustainment.  Because of the enormous resource investment required and 
because of congressional scrutiny, program decisions tend to be 
deliberative and tied to budgetary priorities, schedules, and vagaries.  
Consequently, the materiel solutions developed can take up to 10 to 15 
years to get into the hands of the warfighter. 
        –Robert L. Buhrkuhl2 
 
As Dr. Buhrkuhl states, our traditional defense acquisition processes are primarily 
designed for major weapons systems.  The policies and processes that govern the 
activities of an acquisition program have become cumbersome with significant 
bureaucratic oversight due mostly to the exceptional costs associated with major weapons 
systems.  The time necessary to complete all of the regulatory requirements and comply 
with all of the oversight requirements associated with these programs extends them 
across years of development, testing, and production.  Inefficiencies, such as bureaucratic 
oversight, cost and schedule overruns, and poor system performance, in Government 
acquisition activities have long been the focus of efforts to improve the defense 
acquisition processes.     
The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project conducted in 
2005 states that ―one hundred and twenty-eight prior studies have been done over many 
years to address perceived problems with the system to prevent fraud, waste and abuse.‖ 
Clearly, this large number of studies is an indicator that it is widely recognized that our 
acquisition processes have room for improvement.  It also indicates that, despite the 
recognition of a problem, we still have not ―broken the code‖ when it comes to changing 
the system in a significant and meaningful manner.  Additionally, the DAPA project 
concluded that ―the problems were deeply imbedded in many of the management systems 
                                                 
2 Dr. Robert L. Buhrkuhl, USD (AT&L) Director of JRAC, ―When the Warfighter Needs it Now,‖ 
Defense AT&L Magazine Interview, Nov–Dec 2006. 
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we use in the Department of Defense (DoD), not just the traditional acquisition process.  
We need a radical approach to improvements that would make the process better and 
adapt these improvements to the new security environment of the 21st century.‖3   
Four years later, the House Armed Services Committee appointed yet another 
group—the Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform (hereinafter ―the Panel‖)—to examine 
the Defense Acquisition Process.  This review was motivated by a sense on Capitol Hill 
that Defense Acquisition was not responsive enough to the warfighter’s needs, not 
rigorous enough to track the taxpayer’s investments and not disciplined enough in the 
acquisition of future force systems .  The Panel found that Defense Acquisition has not 
kept pace with the drastic changes in the nature of defense acquisition, especially during 
a time of war.  Similar to the findings in the DAPA report, the Panel found that 
significant improvements can be made in the following areas: the acquisition system; the 
requirements process; the acquisition workforce; the financial management system; and 
industry (i.e., getting the best of the industrial base).4 
Within the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), the Program Manager’s (PM) 
challenge is to balance cost, schedule and performance in order to deliver an affordable, 
timely and useful materiel solution to fill an identified capability gap.  For major 
weapons systems that fall within Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, the policies and 
practices in place are quite rigid.  The PM does not have much latitude when it comes to 
the required gates they must pass through to move to the next step of the acquisition 
process.  As the ACAT level decreases, the PM is afforded more freedom to tailor his 
program, and his oversight requirements are reduced.  Although policies and regulations 
allow more freedom for these programs, a risk averse culture among the stakeholders in 
the acquisition process often prevents the PM from taking advantage of this ability to 
tailor, or streamline, their program.5  Instead, these smaller programs are often expected 
                                                 
3 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Project, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) Executive Summary, December 2005, 2. 
4 House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Findings and 
Recommendations, Defense Acquisition Reform Final Report, March 23, 2010, 1. 
5 Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Stakeholders Working Group, Joint Rapid Acquisition Improvement 
Initiative, 6 December 2006. 
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to get through the same gates without the resources or the impetus from outside 
stakeholders to execute the tasks necessary to negotiate them.  As a result, the schedule 
and cost are often victims of the system, and in the current wartime environment, 
responsiveness has become a priority to maintain superiority and to provide the security 
required to our warfighters. 
A. RAPID ACQUISITION AND OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY 
OPERATIONS 
Since September 11, 2001 the global environment has changed significantly and 
the U.S. military has found itself engaged in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).  
The rules of engagement, tactics and technologies used in these conflicts have changed 
dramatically since the initiation of the offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The DoD went 
to war with the forces and equipment designed to fight a conventional, force-on-force 
conflict, but we have found ourselves battling a highly adaptable, asymmetric enemy.  
The operational environment is fluid and frustrating as the enemy adapts their tactics and 
applies available technologies quicker than we can adapt with materiel solutions 
produced through our traditional acquisition processes.  The traditional Defense 
Acquisition process timeline of 5–15 years to deliver materiel solutions to the warfighters 
has become unacceptable.  
General Petraeus, U.S. Central Command commander, recently stated, ―Never, 
never underestimate how important speed is.  We need what we need now.  As a threat 
emerges, we need to counter it rapidly.‖6  Rapid acquisition has become a critically 
important organizational capability necessary to support our warfighters, and that 
capability has matured and evolved during the contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
The OCOs have highlighted the institutional challenges that the DoD faces in 
satisfying the urgent and critical needs of our combatant commanders.  In an effort to 
breakdown institutional barriers that prevent timely delivery of effective materiel 
                                                 
6 General David Petraeus, ―Adaptive, Responsive and Speedy Acquisitions,‖ Defense AT&L 
Magazine, Jan-Feb 2010, 5. 
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solutions to the warfighter, the Secretary of Defense directed the creation of the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) in 2004.7  As a result, the Department of the Army as 
well as the other Services recognized the need to be more responsive to the combatant 
commanders and established Service specific rapid acquisition activities. 
These rapid acquisition activities have developed processes and best practices, 
learned critical lessons and evolved over the last nine years in order to operate effectively 
in the current OCO environment, and there is an opportunity for the greater acquisition 
community to leverage these processes, best practices, and lessons learned to improve the 
Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) process executed by traditional acquisition 
organizations.  The U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) is a prime example of an 
organization that has overcome many of the institutional barriers and thrives within the 
constraints of the current policies and processes.  It provides an example of innovation, 
flexibility and responsiveness that is worthy of study to determine what is appropriate for 
emulation by other organizations. 
B. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This project captures the Army’s current applicable rapid acquisition policies and 
the processes, best practices and lessons learned through a review of the REF Office.  It 
compares the processes and practices of the REF to the processes and practices executed 
by Joint Project Manager Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Avoidance 
(JPM NBC CA) in support of an Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) program.  The 
comparative analysis will determine where opportunities existed for the REF processes, 
best practices and lessons learned to improve the responsiveness of the PM’s streamlined 
acquisition.   
The scope of the data collection included information from several different 
sources.  The research focuses on documents and information available through open 
sources such as:  magazine articles; established policies and laws; the DAPA report; the 
Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform findings and recommendations; Army Audit 
                                                 
7 Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, SUBJECT: Joint Rapid Acquisition 
Cell (JRAC), 3 September 2004. 
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Agency and U.S. Government Accountability Office reports.  Additional information was 
gathered from interviews with the stakeholders:  the REF Director and Team, the Army 
Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the team lead for the Joint Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System Increment 2 (JNBCRS2) Joint Urgent 
Operational Needs (JUON) effort.  These interviews played a critical role in providing 
information on the REF processes and best practices and the establishment of the case 
study. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Among many recommendations, the DAPA report identified a change from a 
focus on delivering 100% performance in the first production lot to a focus on delivering 
useful military capability within a constrained period of time as a key acquisition 
performance improvement.8  That capability can then be upgraded incrementally as 
technologies mature and operational requirements become clearer.  General Petraeus 
confirmed an operational concurrence of this approach by stressing the need for 
providing an 80% solution today that can be used now rather than waiting months or 
years to get a 100% solution.9 
The REF model provides an example of how an organization can effectively 
implement this approach within the constraints of current policy.  It provides an 
opportunity to examine the capabilities and limitations that the Army acquisition 
community might encounter if they implement the DAPA and the Panel for Acquisition 
Reform recommendations within the traditional acquisition process.  In order to leverage 
this opportunity, this research paper will answer the following questions:   
1. Primary Research Question 
What Army REF processes, practices and lessons learned should be considered by 
the Army within its streamlined acquisition process—Urgent Materiel Release 
(UMR) Process—to increase responsiveness to the warfighter? 
                                                 
8 DAPA Executive Summary, 12. 
9 Petraeus, 5. 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
a) Does the Army have clear policies and guidelines in place regarding 
management of rapid acquisition items?  
b) What processes has the REF implemented to ensure responsiveness? 
c) How do REF processes and practices compare to a streamlined acquisition 
case? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The project documented the current processes of the Army REF, presented a case 
study of a UMR executed by a traditional acquisition organization, and utilized the 
framework created in the DAPA report to establish a comparison between a streamlined 
acquisition program (UMR) and the REF processes and practices to identify opportunities 
for improvements within the streamlined acquisition process. 
The analysis examined all three DoD Decision Support Systems—Joint 
Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS), DAS, and Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting & Execution System (PPBES)—utilizing the framework 
established in the DAPA to focus in the areas of Organization, Workforce, Budget, 
Requirements, Acquisition, and Industry (Figure 1).  Selected REF best practices and 
processes from these areas were compared to the execution of the JNBCRS2 JUON effort 
to identify implementation opportunities to improve and streamline the traditional 




Figure 1. DAPA Framework10 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The authors operated under several assumptions in the conduct of the analysis.  
First, this analysis will not be all inclusive.  It is geared toward rapid acquisition efforts 
with significant resource limitations.  This limited the applicability to programs or efforts 
that take advantage of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) items, Government Off-the-
Shelf (GOTS) items and items that require minimal changes and or improvements.  
Additionally, they made the decision that they would focus on the operation of one rapid 
acquisition organization to keep the scope of the project at a manageable level.  In this 
case, the authors limited their research to the analysis of the policies and practices 
employed by the Army REF Office.  They also limited their data collection to 
information, policies and practices in place as of June 2010.  Because of the fluidity of 
current operations, policies and practices are continually evolving. 
Finally, the case study uses a recent JUON effort, the JNBCRS2 UMR, to provide 
a comparison with the REF processes and best practices.  The analysis draws conclusions 
on how an acquisition program might incorporate select REF practices and processes to 
                                                 
10 DAPA Executive Summary, 4. 
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improve responsiveness.  Two limitations to this approach are evident:  while the 
requirements for each type of program are similar, there is still a difference in the 
concepts of fielding vs. equipping; and the analysis assumes that the JNBCRS2 JUON 
effort is representative of a typical UMR.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
Because the focus of this report is on the REF processes and best practices, it was 
necessary to establish the purpose and role of the REF within the Army and to define the 
best practices and processes that the REF has developed to increase responsiveness to the 
needs of our warfighters.  It is important to note that the REF processes analyzed in this 
report are not the same as those utilized by the REF in first years after the inception of the 
organization in 2002.  They represent the processes that developed over the last 3 years as 
the REF evolved and matured into an organization more aligned with traditional 
acquisition processes.   
The report is divided into seven chapters.  The INTRODCUTION chapter 
provides some insight into the motivation for the project.  It establishes the scope and 
methodology of the research.  It also provides the organization of the paper and some 
basic assumption governing the research. 
The second chapter, BACKGROUND, introduces the current structure of the 
rapid acquisition organizations created specifically to respond to urgent capability 
requirements.  Additionally, it provides an understanding of the REF’s role in that 
community. 
The third chapter, POLICIES, examines the existing policies that apply to rapid 
acquisition.  It also answers the secondary research question:  Does the Army have clear 
policies and guidelines in place regarding management of rapid acquisition items?   
The fourth chapter, PROCESS, documents the REF process.  It establishes the 




research questions:  Does the Army have clear policies and guidelines in place regarding 
management of rapid acquisition items; and what processes has the REF implemented to 
ensure responsiveness? 
The fifth chapter, CASE STUDY, documents a traditional UMR process executed 
by the JPM NBC CA.  This chapter provides the basis for comparison with the REF 
processes in the analysis section. 
The sixth chapter, ANALYSIS, compares the REF processes with the traditional 
UMR process.  It answers the secondary research question:  How do REF processes and 
practices compare to a streamlined acquisition case? 
The final chapter, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, provides the 
answer to the primary research question:  What Army REF processes, practices and 
lessons learned should be considered by the Army within its streamlined acquisition 
process—Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) Process—to increase responsiveness to the 
warfighter?   
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II. BACKGROUND 
A good battle plan that you act on today can be better than 
a perfect one tomorrow. 
General George S. Patton11 
 
The current conflict has challenged the Armed Services with an unconventional 
style of persistent warfare taking place in the midst of a civilian population.  The 
operational environment has become incredibly complex, and the tactical situation has 
evolved rapidly.  The Army, as well as the other services, has struggled to adapt to the 
constantly changing capability requirements of the current conflicts while simultaneously 
modernizing the force for future conflicts.  Traditional defense acquisition is well suited 
for the large, deliberate weapons programs designed for the future force, but it is not as 
responsive to the changes required by the force fighting the current war.   
Historically, the institutional Army has not been as adaptive as the operational 
Army due to an environment that is constrained by laws, regulations, policies and 
scarcity of resources.  Authorities to streamline acquisition actions to meet urgent needs 
have long been in place, and the individual services have processes in place to facilitate 
them.  Unfortunately, ―the fear of being drawn and quartered for an error in bureaucratic 
process‖ has slowed the process and contributed to a limited willingness to use these 
existing authorities.12  
The OCO has forced the maturation and evolution of these processes, and it has 
given rise to new organizations.  During the examination of these processes and policies, 
it is helpful to understand the structure of the rapid acquisition organizations and a bit 
about their history. 
 
                                                 
11 General George Patton, Great-Quotes.com, Gledhill Enterprises, 2011, http://www.great-
quotes.com/quote/837763. 
12 Michael W. Middleton, ―Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,‖ Naval 
Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2006, 6. 
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A. JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL (JRAC) 
The JRAC is the DoD level organization created to assist with the resolution of 
issues impeding the urgent materiel and logistics requirements that combatant 
commanders have certified as operationally critical.  The JRAC is responsible for 
identifying issues and potential solutions for satisfying urgent operational needs that have 
been designated as Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs).  Additionally, it provides a 
single point of contact and accountability on the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff 
for tracking the timeliness of these actions.  IWNs are high visibility Joint Urgent 
Operational Need Statements (JUONS) that require resolution and capability fielding 
within 120 days.  If left unfulfilled, the IWNs could result in the loss of life or mission 
failure. 
B. ARMY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE OFFICE (AAWO)13 
At the Service level, the AAWO is tasked with the integration of military and 
civilian disciplines to rapidly organize, train and equip Army formations to defeat 
asymmetric threats while simultaneously leading change in the Army’s culture toward a 
more adaptive force.  The Army established the AAWO to be the Army’s focal point for 
all asymmetric warfare initiatives -to include development of the Army’s policy planning 
efforts in asymmetric warfare- and serve as its link to the Joint Improvised Explosive 
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).  
The AAWO has two subordinate organizations: the Asymmetric Warfare Group 
(AWG) and the REF.  Each of these organizations has a unique mission. 
1. Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)14, 15 
The AWG is an Army special mission unit that conducts operational advisory 
assistance to Army and Joint Force Commanders.  It enables the identification of 
                                                 
13 2010 Army Posture Statement, Army Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO), 
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/information_papers/Army_Asym
metric_Warfare_Office_(AAWO).asp. 
14 Asymmetric Warfare Group webpage, http://www.awg.army.mil/. 
15 2009 Army Posture Statement, Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), 
http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/asymmetric_warfare_group.html. 
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capability gaps, enhances training and exploits enemy vulnerabilities to mitigate and 
defeat asymmetric threats.  It was designed to craft doctrine for asymmetric warfare, 
improve the Army’s asymmetric warfare capabilities at the operational and tactical levels 
and enhance the Army’s capability to identify and attack enemy vulnerabilities.  The 
AWG observes and collects information about the evolving asymmetric operating 
environment through teams of advisors deployed with operational forces.  These teams 
report back through the AWG to inform senior leaders on the evolving conditions to 
facilitate short term policy and resource allocation decisions.   
2. Rapid Equipping Force (REF)16, 17 
The Army formed the REF in August 2002 to better respond to the urgent needs 
of its operational commanders.  The REF initially consisted of a 13-man staff serving as 
an ―acquisition catalyst‖ where the primary goal was not the development of new 
technologies, but the equipping of operational units by leveraging items that are already 
available in the Army, other services and the private sector.18   
It has evolved into a multifunctional organization with the mission ―to rapidly 
provide capabilities to Army forces employed globally through current and emerging 
technologies in order to improve operational effectiveness.‖19  The REF serves as a 
solution medium, canvassing the military, industry, academia, and the scientific 
community for existing and emerging technologies.  It relies on ―tiger teams‖ that operate 
at home and embedded with units abroad to identify and evaluate deployed forces’ needs 
and desired capabilities.  Their role is to connect potential suppliers with users.20   
The REF mission is focused on equipping versus fielding solutions.  There is an 
important distinction between these two types of actions.  Fielding involves the formal 
                                                 
16 Army Rapid Equipping Force webpage, http://www.ref.army.mil/. 
17 2009 Army Posture Statement, Rapid Equipping Force (REF), 
http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/rapid_equipping_force.html. 
18 D. Bennett Dickson, ―U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force 2002-2007,‖ 2008, 20. 
19 REF Process Brief, April 2009. 
20 Tim Kennedy, ―Rapid-Fielding Team Tasked To Transform Army Acquisition,‖ National Defense, 
February 2004. 
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acquisition processes and bureaucracies that slow the acquisition effort down but reduce 
the risk that the solution is not operationally effective and suitable in any environment for 
use throughout the Army.  Equipping is focused on providing a near term solution for a 
specific combatant commander’s need.  To date, the REF has introduced 700 different 
types of equipment and has provided more than 80,000 items to units deployed 
worldwide in support of OCO.21   
It is also important to understand the evolution of the REF organization over the 
last eight years.  The structure of the REF has evolved to incorporate the lessons learned 
from doing rapid acquisition.  It has become an organization with direct ties to both the 
operational and the acquisition communities (Figure 2).  Additionally, in order to operate 
effectively in the rapid acquisition environment, the REF has evolved its internal 
organization to better align itself with traditional acquisition processes.  It developed 
functional teams in the areas of human resources, technical management, logistics, 
operations, business management, and project management with liaison officers from 
relevant stakeholders from outside the organization.  The actual roles of these functional 
areas will be explored further in Chapter IV. 
                                                 
21 COL (P) Peter N. Fuller, ―Rapid Acquisition – Developing Processes That Deliver Soldier Materiel 
Solutions Now,‖ Army AL&T Magazine, Feb 2008. 
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Figure 2. REF Organization 
Although rapid acquisition initiatives do not have all of the same requirements as 
the traditional processes (e.g., meeting critical performance parameters such as: 
reliability, life cycle cost, full operational effectiveness and suitability), they are still 
governed by policy.  In order to fully understand the REF’s processes and determine 
which of them are appropriate for incorporation within traditional acquisition 
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III. POLICIES 
Laws and regulations that provide considerable flexibility for acquisitions 
supporting urgent situations and national security requirements have existed for some 
time.  Following the commencement of the current OCO, the acquisition community 
attempted to improve its awareness and its capabilities to quickly respond to an array of 
geographically dispersed requirements.  However, the traditional Army acquisition 
organizations have struggled to respond rapidly within the bounds of these existing 
acquisition laws and the bureaucracy inherent in their organizational structure.  The 
Army acquisition policies and processes, created during peace time, were considered 
streamlined and expedient, but they were not responsive enough to provide our 
warfighters what they needed when they needed it.  
As a result, the DoD and Congress implemented statutory and regulatory changes 
increasing the options to streamline acquisition of materiel needed to prosecute and win a 
war in an asymmetric environment.  The following sections present some of the most 
important aspects of policies and regulations that govern the Army’s rapid acquisition 
process.  One of the most relevant statutes governing rapid acquisition was implemented 
as part of the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. 
A. UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 10, SECTION 230222 
Congress mandated the establishment of rapid acquisition and deployment 
procedures through the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314).
23
  It directed the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) to specify procedures for the rapid acquisition and deployment of items that 
were urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or to respond to an urgent safety 
situation.   
                                                 
22 10 U.S. Code Section 2302, Rapid Acquisition and Deployment Procedures, 2006 Main Edition.  
23   Public Law 107-134, Section 806, U.S. Congress, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2003, 2 December 2002. 
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These procedures prescribed processes to:  (1) streamline communications 
between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the acquisition community and the 
research and development community; (2) improve how the Combatant Commanders 
communicate their needs; (3) enhance the acquisition community and the research and 
development community proposal of solutions to meet those needs; and (4) demonstrate, 
rapidly acquire and deploy items proposed in response to combat emergencies.   
Furthermore, Congress amended Section 806 of the Bob Stump NDAA 2003 
through the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
(Public Law 108-375)
24
 to clearly define the Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA).  The 
RAA gives the SECDEF the necessary authority to rapidly acquire and deploy equipment 
to respond to combat emergencies.  Some key provisions that are important to note from 
the 2005 NDAA are:  (1) the SECDEF can use the procedures developed in the NDAA to 
accomplish the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment urgently needed to 
eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities; (2) the 
SECDEF must designate a senior official of the DoD to ensure that the needed equipment 
is acquired and deployed as quickly as possible, with a goal of awarding a contract for the 
acquisition of the equipment within 15 days; finally, (3) upon designation of the senior 
official, the SECDEF shall authorize that official to waive any provision of law, policy, 
directive, or regulation that might unnecessarily impede the rapid acquisition and 
deployment of the needed equipment with the caveat that such impediment is submitted 
in writing and that any waiver is not contrary to any provision of law imposing civil or 
criminal penalties.   
The bill included the following limitations:  (1) acquisitions under this authority 
are limited to no more than $100,000,000 during any fiscal year; (2) SECDEF shall notify 
Congressional Defense Committees within 15 days if such action is deemed necessary; 
 
 
                                                 
24   Public Law 108-375, Section 811, 108
th
 Congress, Ronald E. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, ―Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat 
Emergencies,‖ 28 October 2004. 
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and (3) any acquisition initiated under this authority shall transition to the normal 
acquisition system no later than two years after the date on which the SECDEF makes the 
determination.   
It is important to understand that rapid acquisition initiatives executed under these 
statutes are not consider ―fielded‖ items but ―equipped‖ items, and as such, they have to 
be transitioned to the normal acquisition before the items can be fielded within a Service 
Activity.   
B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 
(CJCSI) 3470.01, RAPID VALIDATION AND RESOURCING OF JOINT 




CJCSI 3470.01 establishes policy and procedures to facilitate assessment, 
validation, sourcing, resourcing and fielding of operationally urgent combatant 
commander needs in the execution-year.  This process does not replace the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process but rather accelerates 
the process of fielding readily available systems to satisfy joint urgent wartime needs.  
This instruction only applies to supporting combatant commands with a JUON that are 
deployed or already operationally employed in support of SECDEF missions.  This 
instruction can only be used to field acquisition category ACAT II-IV equivalent 
programs. 
The process is not intended to replace any other Joint Staff process or to compete 
with any of the current Service processes but rather complement them.  The main purpose 
of the process is to rapidly validate a resource and field urgent operational solutions that 
fall outside of the established Service processes in order to prevent combat loss of life or 
combat mission failure. 
                                                 
25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.1, Rapid Validation and Resourcing 
of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, 15 July 2005. 
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DoDD 5000.0l, along with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition system, ―provides management principles and mandatory policies 
and procedures for managing all acquisition programs.‖ It introduces policies regarding 
the principles of flexibility, innovation, discipline, responsiveness, and streamlined and 
effective management to govern the Defense Acquisition System.  The directive allows 
for the tailoring of program strategies, oversight, documentation, acquisition phases and 
timing, and decision levels to fit the time-sensitivity of the capability need.  In addition, 
the directive states that advanced technology shall be integrated into producible systems 
and deployed in the shortest time practicable.   
Furthermore, DoDD 5000.01 directs that approved, time-phased capability needs 
must be matched with available technology and resources enabling evolutionary 
acquisition strategies.  Evolutionary acquisition strategies are the preferred approach to 
satisfying operational needs.  These strategies allow the fielding of mature increments of 
capability to the warfighter, rather than delaying fielding until the full capability has been 
developed.27 
D. DODI 5000.02, OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
SYSTEM, 2008 
The recently revised DoDI 5000.02 provides instructions for the implementation 
of DoDD 5000.01.  It expands on the concept of evolutionary acquisition as the preferred 
DoD strategy for the rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user.  It defines the 
objective as the balancing of needs and available capability with resources and placing 
capability into the hands of the user quickly.  ―The success of the strategy depends on 
phased definition of capability needs and system requirements, and the maturation of 
technologies that lead to the disciplined development and production of systems 
                                                 
26 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, May 2003, 
paragraph 1.1.2. 
27 DoDD 5000.01, para 4.3. 
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providing increasing capability over time.‖28  In this process, a needed operational 
capability is met over time by developing several increments, each dependent upon 
available mature technology, but recognizing the up-front need for future capability 
improvements. 
Even though DoDI 5000.02 presents the concept of evolutionary acquisition and 
is flexible enough to allow streamlined and phased acquisition (e.g., through the use of 
the UMR process), it does not offer specific guidelines with regard to rapid acquisition.  
As a result, each of the Services has taken responsibility to establish governance and 
guidance on how to manage rapid acquisition in a wartime environment. 
E. ARMY REGULATION (AR) 70-1, ARMY ACQUISITION POLICY, 200429 
AND DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (DA) PAMPHLET (PAM) 70-3, 
ARMY ACQUISITION PROCEDURES, 2008.   
AR 70-1 and DA PAM 70-3 provide policy, guidance and procedures for Army 
Acquisition.  AR 70-1 was last updated in 2004; as a result, it does not reflect the recent 
changes in DoDI 5000.02.  However, a rapid action revision (RAR) was issued in April 
2009 for DA PAM 70-3 to reflect changes in DoDI 5000.02.  Although the policy and the 
PAM do not specifically address how to manage the acquisition of Army rapid 
acquisition items, they integrate the concepts of evolutionary acquisition, and they briefly 
discuss type classification for limited procurement (TC-LP) and the concept of rapid 
response initiatives.30  As of today, the Army uses AR 700-142 and DA PAM 700-142 to 
define the process, policy, and procedures for the accomplishment of Materiel Release 
(MR) and type classification of weapons systems.  On the other hand, the Army uses AR 
71-9 for the procurement and management of rapid acquisition items.  Additionally, it is a 
requirements determination policy not an acquisition of materiel policy. 
                                                 
28 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
Dec 2008, paragraph 2.a. 
29 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Regulation 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy, 31 
December 2003, RAR January 2004. 
30 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Pamphlet 70-3, Army Acquisition Procedures, 28 
January 2008, RAR April 2009, paragraph 1-20 b.(2).  
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F. AR 71-9, WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY DETERMINATION, 2009 
Until a major revision to incorporate guidance in the updated DoDD 5000.1 and 
DoDDI 5000.02 in December 2009, the Army policy for determining materiel 
requirements was based on a 1998 regulation.  The previous version briefly addressed a 
―Requirements Streamlining‖ process31, but it failed to address urgent needs.  The 
updated ―regulation establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the identification, 
determination, and integration of required warfighting capabilities.  It applies to the 
validation and approval of capabilities supporting deliberate force modernization 
planning and the urgent needs of operational commanders.‖32  The Army uses the 
Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process to shorten the acquisition timelines for less 
than ACAT I programs to meet urgent needs during conflict.  However, the regulation 
stipulates that ―(t)he ONS is not a JCIDS capability document but a request for need 
validation and sourcing of a perceived requirement.‖33  ―(T)he ONS provides an 
opportunity for the operational commander, outside the acquisition, combat development, 
and training communities, to initiate the capability determination process.‖34  AR 71-9 is 
the only Army policy that defines ―the policies and procedures for deployed, prepare-to-
deploy, deploying units, deployment ready brigades, and strategic reserve elements, 
evolve over time to best support the warfighter‖ in terms of ―equipping‖ operational 
forces.35 
The regulation introduces the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition 
(CDRT) process as ―a process to identify and approve tactical nonstandard equipment, 
commercial or government-produced, in use in current operation to become sustained 
Army equipment or compete to become an Army acquisition program.‖36  The CDRT 
                                                 
31 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities 
Determination, December 2009. 
32 AR 71-9, para 1-1. 
33 AR 71-9, para 6-1.b. 
34 AR 71-9, para 6-1.a. 
35 AR 71-9, para 7-3.a. 
36 AR 71-9, para 6-4.a. 
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process provides an opportunity to ―reduce the JCIDS document development cycle.‖37  
JCIDS capability requirements may originate from solutions developed in response to a 
field commander’s ONS or from a capability provided by a REF like organization that 
has broader applicability across the Army, especially if the technology provides a critical 
leap-ahead military advantage, mitigating or eliminating a known capability gap.38  
G. TRADOC REGULATION 71-20, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT, 
EXPERIMENTATION AND REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION, 2009 
The recently updated TRADOC Regulation 71-20 prescribes policy for the 
implementation and execution of JCIDS and guidance for TRADOC’s support of the 
DAS.39  This policy defines the roles and responsibilities of the Army Capabilities 
Integration Center (ARCIC) in both the deliberate and accelerated development processes 
to address capability requirements.40  As part of the Accelerated Capabilities 
Development (ACD) process, the ARCIC leads and manages the following:  
identification of current capability needs and candidate solutions; provisioning of the 
context for capabilities development through CONOPS and DOTMLPF analysis; 
determination of deployment and employment options; provisioning of assessments, and 
determination of a way ahead for rapidly equipped capabilities; identification of alternate 
paths into the deliberate JCIDS process; and unit-level integration and assessment of 
solutions in conjunction with the REF Office and the AAWO.41  This regulation states 
that combatant command and Army compliance with the JCIDS process is not required to 
support fielding immediate solutions to the warfighter’s urgent operational needs as they 
should be worked through the JRAC.  Furthermore, it states that JCIDS is a tailorable 
process and that the JROC has identified several alternative paths to allow the accelerated 
                                                 
37 AR 71-9, para 6-4.c. 
38 AR 71-9, para 1-5,b.(2)(a). 
39 Headquarters Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Regulation (TRADOC 
Reg) 71-20, Concept Development, Experimentation and Requirements Determination, May, paragraph 1-
1.  
40 TRADOC Reg 71-20, para 1-4,c(2). 
41 TRADOC Reg 71-20, para 1-4.c(4). 
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identification of capability gaps and potential solutions.  This flexibility allows entry into 
the JCIDS process at the appropriate stage to deliver capabilities rapidly.42  
The regulation describes the ACD and CDRT processes in detail. The ACD 
process starts with the identification of a requirement and ends with the determination of 
a path forward for rapidly equipped capabilities.  It generally consists of three phases:  
identification of a capability requirement and candidate solutions; solution development, 
assessment and deployment; and a program and employment decision.43  ARCIC 
conducts the CDRT process to inform the program and employment decision.  The 
CDRT initiative is conducted semiannually to identify promising capabilities, determine 
operational support for the identified capabilities and make a recommendation to senior 
Army leadership for future action.  Those recommendations are used to determine which 
rapid initiatives should become Army-wide Programs of Record, which should be 
maintained as a ―capability gap‖ solution in theater, and which should be terminated.44 
H. AR 700-142, TYPE CLASSIFICATION, MATERIEL RELEASE, 
FIELDING AND TRANSFER, 2008
45
 AND DA PAM 700-142, 




AR 700-142 and DA PAM 700-142 provide policy, guidance and procedures for 
Army materiel release and fielding to include the UMR policy, procedures and 
documentation requirements that allow the PM to field materiel rapidly to meet a 
capability short fall.  The UMR is solely intended to meet an operational need of a 
deployed or imminently deploying force in support of approved operational 
contingencies, and it is restricted to a specific quantity, location and application.  
                                                 
42 TRADOC Reg 71-20, para 5-3. 
43 TRADOC Reg 71-20, para 9-2.d. 
44 TRADOC Reg 71-20, para 9-3. 
45 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Regulation 700-142, Type Classification, Materiel 
Release, Fielding and Transfer, March 2008, RAR October 2008. 
46 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Pamphlet 700-142, Instructions for Materiel Release, 
Fielding and Transfer, June 2010. 
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The UMR procedures may be used for type-classified and non type-classified 
systems or materiel, to include REF, JIEDDO, Joint Concept Technology Demonstration 
(JCTD), and Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) equipment authorized for 
deployment with the using unit.  However, the UMR regulation specifically states that the 
policy and procedures are not intended as a means to meet budgetary obligations, recover 
schedule slippages, accelerate materiel fielding, provide early opportunities to field units 
for training or testing, or to circumvent the normal materiel release policy.47 
I. SUMMARY 
As evident from the publication dates, many of the laws and regulations that 
affect rapid acquisitions have been updated since the start of the war.  They have been 
modified to provide the flexibility required to meet the demands and urgent needs of our 
combatant commanders.  The statutes, policies and regulations outlined above provide 
the framework for rapid acquisition activities such as the Army REF to operate within, 
but definitive guidelines and procedures are lacking.  Acquisition policies have always 
encouraged flexibility, innovation and responsiveness (especially during wartime), 
however the processes created to implement policies and the large amount of directed 
oversight have limited the flexibility, innovation and responsiveness of the rapid 
acquisition process.  Rapid acquisition activities, like JIEDDO and the REF, could not be 
as effective if they had to adhere to the same procedures as the PM Offices.  In the 
current environment, the timeliness of emerging capability requirements fulfillment is of 
the essence, and it is something that the traditional acquisition process lacks.  
New legislation and updated policies and regulations will not improve the fielding 
of urgent needs by themselves.  They must be coupled with timely, efficient and effective 
acquisition execution led by experienced leaders.  The flexibility provided by some of 
these regulations has offered the Army REF significant latitude for defining their 
business and execution processes over the last eight years.  A prime opportunity exists to 
leverage the lessons that the Army REF has learned as they developed those processes 
                                                 
47 AR 700-142, paragraph 4-9. 
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and translate appropriate practices to our traditional acquisition organizations.  That 
exercise begins an in-depth discussion of the Army’s ACD process.   
31 
IV. PROCESS 
We can’t use the traditional peacetime acquisition processes.  All of our 
processes have to be much more rapid and much more responsive. 
General Petraeus48 
 
A. ACCELERATED CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT (ACD) 
The current OCO has forced the Army to develop an ACD process to improve its 
ability to respond rapidly to emerging requirements in an asymmetric environment.  The 
Army rapid acquisition agencies have utilized the ACD process to quickly identify 
critical gaps, develop solutions, and deploy capabilities, while TRADOC’s ARCIC has 
ensured an integrated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) equipping approach in support of these efforts. 
The ACD process begins with the identification of a requirement and ends with 
the determination of a path forward for rapidly equipped capabilities.  Figure 3 depicts 
the three phases of the Army’s ACD process:  Requirements Determination, Accelerated 
Capability Development and Deployment and Transition. 
                                                 
48 General David Petraeus, ―Adaptive, Responsive and Speedy Acquisitions,‖ Defense AT&L 
Magazine, Jan-Feb 2010. 
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Figure 3. Accelerated Capability Development49 
1. Requirements Determination   
The basis of requirements for the fielding of capabilities to address immediate 
needs and the primary source of ACD requirements is the ONS or JUONS validated by 
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) or the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), 
respectively.  However, the REF has created a streamlined document based on the ONS, 
the REF 10 Liner, to further accelerate requirements identification.  The REF ―10 Liner‖ 
(Figure 4) has proved to be a simple and effective method of capturing urgent 
                                                 
49 TRADOC Reg 71-20, Figure 9-1. 
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requirements, and, as a result, it has been identified as a best practice by a DoD LSS 
Rapid Acquisition Process Analysis Cross Functional Team.  It will be discussed later in 
this chapter as part of the REF process.   
 
 
Figure 4. REF 10-Liner50 
2. Accelerated Capability Development and Deployment   
In response to validated urgent needs requirements, Army rapid acquisition 
agencies, like the REF, may propose candidate solutions for deployment directly to the 
VCSA.  To accelerate the process, many of the developmental and operational testing 
requirements, that are normally required for acquisition systems, are relaxed.  However, 
the agency responsible for deploying the candidate solution must ensure, at a minimum, 
that the item is safe for warfighter use and develop an assessment plan prior to providing 
the initial capability.  This assessment plan consists of pre- and post-deployment 
assessments to ensure safety, technical applicability and operational utility.  Once the 
initial testing is completed to ensure safety and operational effectiveness (i.e., provide the 
warfighter enough information on the systems so that they can employ them as quickly 
                                                 
50 William Beasley, Action Memo: Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Rapid Acquisition Process Analysis Cross 
Functional Team Tollgate Review, Tab C, December 19, 2008. 
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and with as much confidence as possible)51, the Army makes the deployment decision for 
the selected solution.  The role of the REF within the ACD process and their internal 
processes created to meet the urgent needs of the combatant commanders will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
3. Transition   
The Army developed the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) 
process as a means for determining a disposition for rapidly equipped capabilities.  The 
CDRT process52 is the approved Army process to transition new capabilities proven in 
the operational theaters of war (e.g., tactical non-standard equipment, commercial or 
government-produced) into long-term capabilities for the current and future force.53  The 
process categorizes capabilities as: 
1) Enduring: Has broad applicability across the entire Army and should 
transition to an Army acquisition program or DOTmLPF integrated 
capabilities recommendation (lowercase m signifies no new materiel 
proposal).  The system fills a current capability gap and is applicable to the 
Future Force. 
2) Sustain: Should be sustained in support of a specific theater or named 
operation.  The system fills a current identified gap but it is not applicable to 
the entire Army or useful for the Future Force. 
3) Terminate: Should not receive further HQDA resources. 54  The system is not 
sustained by HQDA funding but may be retained by the unit and supported 
with unit funding—exception is battle command systems which must be 
turned in immediately. 
The CDRT process, which is conducted on a semi-annual basis, consists of five 
phases:  identification, assessment, recommendation, validation, and approval (Figure 5).   
                                                 
51 Dr. Charles McQueary, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, ―The Key to Weapons that 
Work,‖ Defense AT&L Magazine, Jan-Feb 2008. 
52 2009 Army Posture Statement, Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT), 
http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/capabilities_development_for_rapid_transition.html. 
53 Chief, Asymmetric Warfare Division, Accelerated & Capabilities Development Directorate, 
ARCIC TRADOC, Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Iteration #7 Kickoff Meeting 
Presentation, February 3, 2009. 
54 AR 71-9, para 6-4.a., 27. 
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Figure 5. Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Process (CDRT)55 
During the identification phase, the ARCIC Accelerated Capabilities 
Development Division (ACD Div), in conjunction with JIEDDO, AAWO, REF Office, 
and HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 (DAMO-CI), develops the primary list 
of CDRT candidate capabilities from operationally mature solutions or solutions that are 
in use in current operations.  Subsequently, this list is distributed to force modernization 
branch proponents, TRADOC Capability Managers and TRADOC G-3/5/7 as well as 
non-TRADOC members of the CDRT community of interest to verify the candidate 
information during the assessment phase.  These organizations have an opportunity to 
recommend additional capabilities for consideration at this point to ensure that all of the 
qualified candidates are considered. 
This list is staffed through the operational Army for review and evaluation as to 
its disposition.  Additionally, the final list is staffed to the generating force for comment.   
ACD Div evaluates the feedback and revises and re-staffs it as appropriate to categorize 
and prioritize the final list of recommended capabilities before it enters the validation 
stage.   
                                                 
55 TRADOC Reg 71-20, Figure 9-2. 
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The categorized and prioritized recommendations are forwarded to an HQDA 
level council of colonels to begin the validation process.  Once the council of colonels 
validates the recommendations, they proceed through reviews by the Director of ARCIC 
and the HQDA G-3 Staff before arriving at the TRADOC Commander for final 
validation.  Once the TRADOC Commander has validated the CDRT recommendations, 
they are forwarded to the Army Requirements Oversight Council for approval and 
execution of the decisions which may include the official initiation into the JCIDS 
process for enduring programs. 
During the current OCO, the Army has utilized a number of processes to equip 
units with new systems resulting in increased capabilities for deployed forces.  Many of 
these systems have been assessed, through the CDRT process, to determine their final 
disposition.  After nine iterations of the CDRT process, the Army has determined that: 
10.7% of the items should be transitioned as enduring capabilities, 65.3% should be 
sustained in a limited manner and 24% should be terminated or no longer supported. 56  
In the first eight iterations, 472 systems and 12 non-materiel capabilities were 
considered and of those, 28 were approved for transition to acquisition programs, 316 
were approved to be sustained in OEF/OIF with supplemental funding, 116 approved for 
termination (no further development or support) and 15 materiel capabilities were 
approved to merge into existing acquisition programs. The pending tenth iteration 
recommendations include eight materiel candidates, one non-materiel candidate and one 
candidate for termination.  Such systems as the IED Route Clearance Package (MMPV 
RG 33L, MPCV Buffalo and VMMD Husky), the Armored Security Vehicle, Crew 
Remote Operated Weapons System (CROWS), and Raven were CDRT candidates that 
are now acquisition programs, and others, such as the Green Laser Interdiction System 
and Boomerang, have approved CPDs. 
                                                 
56 Chief, Asymmetric Warfare Division, Accelerated & Capabilities Development Directorate, 
ARCIC TRADOC, Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Iteration #9 Briefing to the 
Army Requirements and Resources Board, May 6, 2010. 
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B. THE ROLE OF THE REF WITHIN ACD 
The REF is a multifunctional organization that can rapidly validate requirements 
that increase lethality, improve force protection and enhance survivability on the 
battlefield to fill critical capability gaps.  The REF combines and integrates staff 
functions across several Army staff elements and Army commands to bring off-the-shelf 
materiel solutions to the warfighter through a streamlined acquisition methodology.  
Their methodology accelerates materiel solution developments and technology insertions 
that improve the operational effectiveness and Soldier safety of deployed Army forces.57   
Organizationally, the REF is aligned under the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 with 
close working relationship with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology)(ASA(ALT)).  The REF Director reports directly to the 
Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization (DAMO-OD) with additional 
responsibilities to the VCSA for coordination (Figure 2).  Additionally, in 2005 the Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE) designated all current and future REF programs as special 
interest ACAT III programs.  As a result, the REF Director also provides semi-annual 
program updates to the AAE through their designated milestone decision authority (USA 
RDECOM Commander).58  This organizational structure provides the REF Director with 
the authority required to execute the rapid mission while maintaining an adequate level of 
ASA(ALT) oversight and support.  It combines combat development and materiel 
development functions within the same organization59.  
In an effort to effectively execute the REF’s mission, the REF’s Director issued 
guidance that allows his team to maximize flexibility in executing the mission while still 
meeting his intent.  Additionally, the REF developed and instituted a repeatable business 
process, which includes a ―binning‖ system to prioritize efforts, to ensure consistency and 
diligence.  
                                                 
57  Interview by the authors with COL Bishop, U.S. Army REF Director, and the REF team, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA, 29 March 2010. 
58 U.S. Army Audit Agency, ―Rapid Equipping Force Initiative,‖ Report No. A-2007-0131-ALA, 18 
May 2007. 
59 COL David J. Bishop, Director Rapid Equipping Force, ―Strength of a Nation: Rapid Equipping of 
our Soldiers at War,‖ 10 Dec 2008. 
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1. REF Director’s Guidance  
To facilitate initiative and autonomy within the REF, the Director designated the 
following as key tasks, providing guidance and conveying his intent:  
 Identify unit requirements and capability gaps 
 Follow best business practices 
 Facilitate effective equipment hand-off to units 
 Ensure proper sustainment 
 Conduct useful assessment of REF equipping assets 
 Work friendly with other organizations 
 Ensure REF projects are handed off appropriately 
 Be quiet professionals (let the customer speak for the REF) 
 Entertain out of the box solutions 
 Explore innovative ideas and approaches 
 Accept risk—do not be afraid to fail 
 Never break the law 
 
The REF’s primary mission is to provide the combatant commanders with rapidly 
employable materiel solutions to fill critical capability gaps, but the REF Director made a 
conscious decision to make the alignment of the REF’s efforts with the institutionalized 
Army acquisition process a top priority. 
2. REF Binning System 
To increase responsiveness to the warfighter needs and to meet the Director’s 
intent and timelines, the REF developed (through the use of the lean six sigma process) 
an internal business process divided into phases with key decision points along the way.  
As part of this process, REF projects are separated into three basic categories or bins: 
 Bin 1—Simple Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)/Government Off-the-Shelf 
(GOTS) 
 Bin 2—Modified COTS/GOTS 
 Bin 3—Prototype Development 
 
The delivery timelines associated with these categories are: 
 Bin 1—Average of 90 Days (Span of 7-180 Days) 
 Bin 2—Average of 180 Days (Span of 45 Days—2 Years) 
 Bin 3—Average of 1 Year (Span of 2 Days—2 Years) 
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The span of times to deliver represents actual data from previously executed projects.  
The stated goal for all REF projects is 90 days or less.60   
To focus on projects that best meet the Director’s intent and fulfill the REF 
mission, they have developed a REF Requirements Matrix (Figure 6).  The matrix 
facilitates the prioritization of projects based on the origin of the requirement and the 
REF Bin within which the solution falls.  As with all government organizations, they 
operate with limited resources, and they must maximize their return on investment. 
 
Figure 6. REF Requirements Matrix  
3. REF Process 
The REF process is an abbreviated process tailored to get a solution to the field 
quickly, but it is natural that it would reflect the basic methodology of traditional 
acquisition.  The REF process consists of four major phases: requirements, materiel 
solution, deployment and transition.  Just as there are key decision points or milestones in 
                                                 
60 LTC Dean M. Hoffman, IV, ―Lean Six Sigma Rapid Equipping Force Equipping Process 
LD12550,‖ 19 June, 2009, slide 3. 
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the traditional process, there are four key decision points for the REF Director:  
Requirement and Director’s Intent Approval, Cost\Schedule\Performance Approval, 
Equipping Decision, and Disposition Decision (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. REF Process61 
a. Requirements 
Requirements definition is a critical task that defines the relevance and 
feasibility of an effort.  As with traditional acquisition, the requirement provides the 
foundation of the program.  If it is ill defined or unstable, the success of the project will 
be at risk.  The key activities during the requirement phase are:  Requirements Receipt, 
Mission Analysis, Requirements and Director’s Intent Approval, and Requirements 
Refinement.   
(1) Requirements Receipt. The source of the requirement 
determines the row in the REF Requirements Matrix (Figure 6) for the project priority 
                                                 
61 REF Process Chart, REF Visit, March 29, 2010. 
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designation.  The REF team receives requirements from multiple sources.  In order of 
priority, they are: Director’s Initiative (e.g., a call directly from theater or an issue in 
which the Director has taken a personal interest), requests from theater in the form of the 
REF 10-liner, traditional urgent need requests (e.g., JUONS, ONS, IWNS, Combat 
Mission Need Statement (CMNS)), other government agency (OGA) initiatives (e.g., 
DARPA, S&T) and industry’s initiatives   
To enhance responsiveness, the REF Director and his team are as 
directly connected to the warfighter as possible.  A significant number of the REF 
civilian employees have prior military experience, and many of them have battlefield 
experience.  Additionally, as a former combat brigade commander, the REF Director has 
done tours in OCO giving him a firsthand perspective of the challenges facing current 
commanders.  He visits Soldiers on the battlefield when possible and maintains open 
lines of communication with the combatant commanders (i.e., one phone call away).  The 
Director also communicates regularly with Army G-3/5/7 and the VCSA as part of the 
requirements determination process to ensure consistency with Army priorities and 
training strategies.62   
The REF also maintains operational contact teams or ―Tiger 
teams‖ in theater.  These teams ―maintain a close working relationship with the units 
including participation in unit combat operations.  [They share] the same hardships and 
dangers as the units they [support and come] under fire when working with these units.‖63  
They periodically provide information back to the REF office that includes emerging 
requirements and technologies being used in theater that should be considered by the 
REF as materiel solutions to fill capability gaps. 
(2) Mission Analysis. Once the requirement is received, the 
REF staff conducts a mission analysis in order to provide an informed recommendation 
to the REF Director.  Their recommendation supports the first decision point in the REF 
 
 
                                                 
62 Interview by the authors with COL Bishop, 29 March 2010. 
63 Dickson, U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force 2002-2007 Booklet, 81-82. 
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process where the Director approves the requirement and provides his intent for the 
project.  This decision point is similar to the Materiel Development Decision in the 
traditional process.   
As a result of a Lean Six Sigma project, the REF has developed an 
efficient and effective process for this mission analysis of requirements, called METT-
TC-FLARS.  This process includes 11 factors:  M-Mission, E-Enemy, T-Terrain and 
Weather, T-Troops and Support Available, T-Time Available, C-Civil Considerations, F-
Funding, L-Legal, A-Assessments, R-Redundancy, and S-Sensitivity.64 
This METT-TC-FLARS mission analysis process was developed 
to assist the bin team and staff analysis of the requirements relevant factors, from a REF 
perspective, in order to develop an informed recommendation to the REF Director.  The 
process provides a repeatable method for analyzing well defined factors that have been 
identified as descriptions of relevant aspects of the environment.  The REF has 
determined that ―the accurate depiction of the environment is necessary for good decision 
making.‖65  A detailed description of the METT-TC-FLARS process and factor 
descriptions are provided as an appendix to this report.  Upon completion of the METT-
TC-FLARS process, the bin team and REF staff present their recommendation and their 
understanding of the facts to the Director. 
(3) Requirement and Director’s Intent Approval. The results of 
the METT-TC-FLARS analysis and recommendation are not necessarily reflective of the 
REF Directors ultimate decision.  The REF Director does not consider each effort in 
isolation, but rather as part of the total decision environment.  He combines the 
information presented to him with all of the other relevant information to which the staff 
may not be privy and integrates it with sound doctrinal and technical competence.  
Ultimately, he has to consider the consequences of each decision as it follows from 
previous decisions, enables future decisions, and prevents other future decisions.  He 
considers each item of information presented that includes: the warfighter’s problem (i.e., 
what are they trying to resolve?), the capability gap (i.e., requirement/urgent need), and 
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65 Rapid Equipping Force, Rapid Equipping Force Mission Analysis Template, Slide 3, January 2010. 
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the proposed solution.  His approval decision will include guidance for requirement 
refinement and his intent for the effort.  His intent provides general guidance that will 
empower the bin team to act with initiative and autonomy which, in turn, accelerates the 
equipping process.66 
(4) Requirements Refinement. During the Requirements 
Refinement step, the bin team adjusts their initial analysis to reflect the Director’s 
guidance.  Additionally, the bin team derives the performance parameters necessary to 
meet the requirement.  These parameters are the criteria that will drive solution 
identification activities. 
b. Materiel Solution  
The Materiel Solution phase is analogous to the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase of the DAS.  It encompasses all of the activities 
necessary to develop the solution from identification to testing.  The REF process for this 
phase consists of:  Solution Identification; Cost, Schedule, and Performance Approval; 
Contracting and Purchasing; Vendor Production; and Safety Testing.  The phase ends 
with an Equipping Decision from the REF Director.  Concurrently, TRADOC conducts 
an initial CONOPS and abbreviated DOTMLPF assessment to assist in determining if the 
solution is adequate and how a unit might implement the materiel solution.  Additionally, 
TRADOC G3/5/7 monitors progress to ensure consistency with training strategies and 
priorities.67 
c. Identify Solution 
The first step in Materiel Solution phase begins with market research.  
Depending on the complexity of the requirement, the Bin team may conduct formal 
market research through Requests for Proposals, Request for Information, and/or 
technology search services or informal market research through DoD/National 
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Laboratories, Program Executive Offices (PEOs), and/or OGAs.   Based on the results of 
the market research, the team develops the acquisition strategy. 
The acquisition strategy development very closely resembles traditional 
acquisition practices in this area.  The team develops the statement of work; the 
independent government cost estimate; the contracting methodology; and the testing, 
sustainment, and training strategy.  The result of the market research and the 
development of the acquisition strategy form the basis for the REF Director’s Cost, 
Schedule, and Performance Approval decision brief.  
(5) Cost, Schedule, and Performance Approval. The Cost, 
Schedule, and Performance Approval decision point is the second opportunity for the 
Director to ensure that the project is proceeding in accordance with his intent and provide 
additional guidance before contract award.  The Director reviews all aspects of the plan 
to determine if the project is sufficiently prepared to move forward with contract award.  
There are several parallels that can be drawn between the traditional Milestone B 
decision point and the Cost, Schedule, and Performance Approval decision point.  In both 
cases, key information for the decision is presented in the form of the acquisition 
strategy, a cost estimate, and some form of a system specification to inform the decision.  
Once the decision authority is satisfied, the team can proceed with contract award.68  
(6) Contract & Purchase. Contracting is a portion of the REF 
Process that still provides a significant challenge.  Because Federal funds are being 
expended and contracting operations are handled by contracting commands independent 
of the REF organization, the bureaucracy and oversight involved with this step make it a 
rate limiting factor.  The REF projects are subject to the same formal requirements as 
traditional acquisition programs.  They include lengthy review and approval processes 
that are tiered based on the total value of the contract.  In an effort to streamline this 
process, the REF has entered into an agreement with the Research, Development, and 
Engineering Command (RDECOM) Contracting Office to fund seven full time 
employees in their office to support REF actions.  Additionally, the REF has four 
government employees in the REF office whose primary role is contracting.  As with 
                                                 
68 Rapid Equipping Force, REF Cost, Schedule and Performance Worksheet, 2009. 
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traditional acquisition, the contract award process ends with a kick-off meeting to start 
development and/or production depending on the chosen materiel solution. 69 
(7) Vendor Production. The Vendor Production step includes 
all of the vendor actions necessary to produce the item.  During this step the REF staff 
monitors the cost and schedule associated with the production of the item, as well as the 
performance of the item in terms of the criteria established in the Requirement 
Refinement step.  Once items representative of the items to be equipped have been 
produced, they can begin requisite testing. 
(8) Safety Test. The Army Test and Evaluation Command 
(ATEC) conducts both pre-deployment and post-deployment assessments to ensure 
safety, technical applicability and operational usefulness. Army regulations require the 
Program Manager to obtain a Safety Confirmation from ATEC prior to fielding a system.  
In the case of the Army rapid activities like the REF, even though they deal with rapid 
initiatives and their items are not considered ―fielded‖, this requirement also applies as 
verification of safety is a requirement that cannot be waived.   
The Safety Confirmation is a document that identifies and assesses 
risks for hazards that are not adequately controlled or mitigated, lists any technical or 
operational limitations or precautions and highlights any safety problems that require 
further investigation and testing.  The number of Safety Confirmations released in 
support of OCO has increased exponentially since 2001. 70  By the end of Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2009, Safety Confirmations released in support of OCO were about the same as for 
programs of record.  
ATEC has evolved to achieve balance between the requirements of 
the traditional acquisition process and the current rapid equipping by transforming the 
way it does business.  ATEC has created policy guidance (Figure 8) detailing how to 
manage rapid initiatives and urgent materiel release items to ensure responsiveness to all 
customer’s needs while remaining faithful to supporting the warfighter and acquisition 
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70  U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Rapid Initiative Test & Evaluation for Army Audit 
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community with high quality and operationally relevant technical information.  As a 
result, a concise Capabilities and Limitations (C&L) report is released concurrently with 
the required Safety Confirmation to provide the warfighter and the decision makers with 
a quick assessment of the operational effectiveness and suitability of the item.  The C&L 
report characterizes for the PM and Soldier what the system does and does not do as well 
as how to employ it to get the most effective use out of it.71 
Additionally, ATEC has embedded liaison officers within the 
Program Executive Offices and some of the rapid offices (to include REF) to provide test 
and evaluation support as early as the requirement phase to determine testability of the 
requirement.  ATEC has provided liaisons to the REF since early 2004.  The ATEC 
liaisons are responsible for: gathering the REF requirements, coordinating any test 
required by the Developmental Test Command to assess system safety and ensuring that 
all required T&E documents (i.e., safety confirmation and C&L report) necessary to 
deploy the equipment to theater are provided to the REF within the REF timeline of 180 
days or less (i.e., for Bin 1 and 2). 
The ATEC System Team (AST), located at HQ ATEC, is also a 
key support element to the REF acquisition process.  The team negotiates with the REF 
project leader on the minimum essential test and evaluation needed to support an 
informed equipping decision with an acceptable test schedule and within reasonable 
funding requirements. The AST prepares a test and evaluation concept based on the 
complexity and maturity of the system, the time and resources available to conduct 
testing, availability of the system for testing and the level of risk associated with the 
intended use of the system (i.e., safety concerns). 
 
                                                 
71 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation (ATEC) Interim Policy Guidance (IPG) 08-4, Update on the Rapid 
Initiatives (RI) and Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) Process within ATEC, 25 September 2008. 
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Figure 8. ATEC RI and UMR Process72 
(9) Equip Decision. The final step of the Materiel Solution 
phase is the Equip Decision gate.  The REF staff presents the current status of the project 
with respect to cost, schedule, and performance as well the results of all tests to the 
Director.  The Director considers all of the information and determines if the system is 
                                                 
72  ATEC IPG 08-4, Figure 1. 
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ready to proceed to the Deployment phase or whether the item or plan needs to be 
modified prior to moving to the next phase.  This decision point is the REF Process 
equivalent of the Full Rate Production decision. 
d. Deployment 
The Deployment phase of the REF Process is focused on traditional 
logistical functions as well as follow-on assessments of the item’s performance.  The 
REF has a Logistics Management Division consisting of logistics analysts, transportation 
coordinators, a warehouse manager, and a property book team that manage the execution 
of these tasks.  The phase consists of three major activities and a decision point.  The 
three activities are: Ship and Deliver, Train, and Assess, and the decision point is the final 
Disposition Decision for the item from the REF Director.   
As with traditional acquisitions, the REF has recognized the importance of 
considering logistics early in the project lifecycle.  Key logistics tasks are divided into 
logistics analysis, transportation coordination, warehouse management, and property 
book management functional areas, and they are completed throughout the REF Process 
(Figure 9).  Although a significant amount of planning and preparatory work is conducted 
in the Requirements and Materiel Solution Phases, the REF Logistics Management 
Division becomes the main effort during the Deployment Phase.  Many of the tasks 
conducted by the REF Logistics Management Division in this phase are analogous with 
New Equipment Training (NET) fielding team tasks.  Furthermore, the REF develops an 
acquisition and support plan approved by the Army Materiel Command for every item 
that it equips.73 
 
                                                 




Figure 9. REF Logistics Tasks74 
(10) Ship & Deliver. The shipping and delivery process for REF 
items is tailored to each project.  The logistical planning is conducted throughout the 
lifecycle of the project, and it is an integral part of the overall acquisition strategy.  
Generally, the items are shipped from the vendor to the REF warehouse where they are 
inventoried, entered into the property system, and packaged for shipment.  If the 
requesting unit is already deployed, the operational contact teams in theater call the items 
forward and conduct the hand off of the equipment to the unit.  If the unit has not yet 
deployed, the item will be shipped to the unit.  In either case, REF personnel will 
facilitate training on the equipment once it is received by the requesting unit.  
(11) Train. As part of the evolution of its process, the REF has 
―validated the need to provide not only equipment, but also training and sustainment 
support for the equipment that was delivered to units.‖75  The preferred training concept 
is to train the unit on equipment at their home station prior to deployment, so that the unit 
can include the equipment in unit training conducted in preparation for deployment. 
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The REF has facilitated home station training when possible.  Additionally, the 
REF has coordinated with the Combat Training Centers to inject rapid equipping into 
their Mission Readiness Exercises.76  Unfortunately, due to the nature of urgent needs 
identification, training prior to deployment is not usually possible.  In many cases 
training is conducted on-site by the operational contact teams that deliver the equipment. 
(12) Assess. As part of the deployment phase, the same 
operational contact teams that gather emerging requirements and facilitate deployment 
and training of the equipment in theater are also collecting feedback about the operational 
effectiveness, safety, training adequacy, maintenance problems, vulnerabilities, and 
survivability issues from the warfighters.  Additionally, ATEC has established Forward 
Operating Assessment (FOA) teams,77 which are made up of Soldiers and DA civilians 
that are located throughout Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait to observe employment of 
equipment from the REF, JIEDDO and other commands.  The ATEC FOA teams conduct 
Theater Data Events (TDE) through questionnaires, one-on-one interviews, observation 
and surveys making it a point to talk directly with Soldiers and unit leaders to get various 
perspectives on how the equipment or technology is performing in the field.  As a result, 
―(t)he information exchange between personnel in Iraq and the test community has been 
shortened to just a few hours in some cases.  The feedback loop is clearly faster and more 
direct.‖78 ATEC uses this data to propose new technical solutions or modifications to 
enhance Soldier’s safety and improve their working conditions and to update the C&L 
report which provides essential information to Army leadership and acquisition decision 
makers for disposition determination.  The TDEs provide a means to follow up on 
systems that are rapidly ―equipped‖ with little or no testing and expand the user’s 
knowledge of materiel capabilities and limitations. 79  
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e. Disposition Decision 
The feedback from the operational contact teams and the ATEC FOAs 
provide the REF Director with information to support his final decision point, the 
Disposition Decision.  At this decision point, the REF Director evaluates the item and 
determines the ultimate disposition of the item from the REF’s perspective.  He has the 
option to terminate support of the item, continue support the item for a limited time, and 
transition support of the item to the gaining command.  He also has the option to 
recommend transition of the item as an enduring capability.  After evaluating all of the 
assessment data, the REF Director and his team determine the disposition 
recommendation to be provided to the RDECOM Commander, who is the Milestone 
Decision Authority.   
f. Transition 
The REF Disposition Decision precedes entry into the last phase of the 
REF Process, Transition.  In this phase, the RDECOM Commander considers the REF 
recommendation, and then submits proposed candidates with the disposition 
recommendation to ARCIC for determination of disposition through the CDRT process.  
(13) Materiel Transition . The level of transition at this point in 
the project lifecycle is dependent on the MDA’s decision and the sustainment strategy.  
The REF is not adequately funded to sustain equipped items indefinitely, so the goal is to 
transition sustainment to the gaining command as soon as possible.  Generally, the REF 
plans for no more than one year of sustainment.  The ideal solution is that the capability 
will transition to an enduring capability through the CDRT process. 
(14) Sustain, Rebuys, Spiral, etc. The final step in the REF 
process is dependent on the Director’s disposition decision.  As part of REF Sustainment 
Operations, there are options for the REF to continue to sustain the item while the unit is 
deployed.  A final option, if the situation warrants, is for the REF to provide up to a two 
year funding bridge or conduct rebuys of the item to sustain the capability.  
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4. REF Knowledge Management System80 
The REF has as its explicit mission to rapidly provide capabilities to Army forces 
employed globally in order to improve operational effectiveness.  Naturally, that mission 
is data-dependent. Fulfilling requirements economically, efficiently and effectively is a 
function of the speed of business intelligence communication created with data across the 
Enterprise from multiple locations and security classifications. 
The REF spent several years utilizing the Science & Technology Enterprise 
Management System (STEM) that was designed for Science and Technology (S&T) and 
promised to provide partnerships and access to all data on S&T relevant for the REF.  
Unfortunately, this partnership did not deliver sufficiently. 
Consequently, the REF Director determined that a Knowledge Management 
System (KMS) was necessary to support the REF efforts.  In 2009, the REF contracted to 
build a KMS that would allow the REF Enterprise, stateside and OCONUS, to see all the 
REF data, end-to-end, for situational awareness. The REF Director’s intent was to have 
all information related to an item (i.e., cost, schedule and performance) documented in 
one electronic document management system such that it can be readily available and 
accessible by all stakeholders.  The electronic document management system was to 
include information such as: funding; contracting status; items fielded; item operational 
performance vs. expectation; value of item in the war fight; Soldier’s assessment on 
usability, ease of use and likeability; and ATEC T&E assessment (i.e., C&L report and 
Safety Confirmation).  Additionally, each item was to be assessed (i.e., color coded: 
green, amber or red) in two areas: operational performance (value to the warfighter) and 
programmatic performance (how well the REF is accomplishing the requirement). 
That vision was realized in the form of the Director’s Common Operational 
Picture (COP) (Figure 10) and in an automated reporting system that utilizes all REF data 
to produce a report on past, present and anticipated requirements and projects.  Central to 
meeting the Director’s intent is a communication capability that allows free input and 
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Rapid Equipping Force, August 4, 2010. 
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output of data in a timely manner.  It provides the ability to visualize the project from 
―cradle-to-grave.‖ This capability provides the REF the ability to answer questions and 




Figure 10. Common Operational Picture 
As of the conclusion of our data collection, the REF Director has established high 
level requirements: migrate data out of STEM and into a KMS that would allow all data 
in the REF to be used for generating a COP, situational awareness and enterprise 
visibility. The rapid prototyping environment has proven ideal for the REF, given the 
constant flux and requests for alterations and additional, on-the-fly requirements. 
Although it is still a work in progress, the KMS effort is on-track to deliver an enterprise 
solution that compares to the best practices of knowledge management.  
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V. CASE STUDY AND ANALYSIS 
A comparison between the REF’s rapid acquisition processes and a traditional 
Urgent Materiel Release program provides an opportunity to identify strengths and 
efficiencies of the REF process that could enhance traditional acquisition processes.  For 
this research, a UMR program conducted by the Joint Project Manager for Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Contamination Avoidance (JPM NBC CA) provides the 
comparative opportunity. 
This chapter will be organized into three main sections using the major phases of 
the REF process as a framework:  Requirements, Materiel Solution Development, and 
Deployment.  Each section will include a discussion of the UMR case and a comparative 
study that analyzes aspects of the REF process that could enhance a traditional UMR.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2007, the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) identified a 
homeland defense urgent need for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
(CBRN) dismounted reconnaissance capability within the U.S. Army Reserve CBRN 
Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF).  NORTHCOM determined that 
these units lacked the equipment to perform sampling, detection and presumptive 
identification of the full spectrum of hazards to include toxic industrial chemical (TIC) 
detection and protection capability.81  Additionally, in 2008, the U.S. Army V Corps 
identified an urgent need within the 12
th
 Chemical Company for a CBRN dismounted 
reconnaissance capability for European theater CBRN response and OCO operational 
support.  This unit also had inadequate capability to detect TICs and Toxic Industrial 
Materials (TIM) and to protect Soldiers conducting prolonged operations in such 
environments while dismounted.82  The Operational Needs Statements (ONS) were 
                                                 
81 U.S. Army 20
th
 Support Command, Memorandum, SUBJECT:  Operational Needs Statement 
(ONS) for Dismounted Chemical Biological, Radiological (CBRN) Recon Equipment Capability, Undated. 
82 Headquarters, Special Troops Battalion, V Corps, Memorandum, SUBJECT:  Operational Needs 
Statement (ONS) for Dismounted Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 
Reconnaissance Equipment Capability and Training, 7 January 2008. 
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initiated through the Department of the Army process, but became Joint Urgent 
Operational Needs (JUONS) due to the joint nature of CBRN equipment procurement.  
The JUONS were submitted through the Joint Staff and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
(JRAC) initiating the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process.  
B. REQUIREMENTS—JCIDS 
Al Qaeda doesn't have a JCIDS process, and we need to be able to operate 
much quicker and inside our adversary's decision rate. 
 
Lt. Gen. David Deptula83 
1. UMR Case 
The NORTHCOM JUONS was submitted and the Joint Staff process officially 
initiated in May of 2007.  The JUONS was processed through the Joint Capability 
Development Directorate Staff (J-8), JRAC, the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), Force 
Protection Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), and Budget Office Director (BOD) for 
validation and determination of funding allocation, in accordance with the JUONS 
validation and resourcing process described in Enclosure A, Figure 1 of CJCSI 3470.01.  
The JUONS was validated in July 2007.  The validation process took about twenty days 
over the notional timeline prescribed in CJCSI 3470.01, consuming approximately two 
months from the initiation of the requirement process to requirement validation.  The V 
Corps JUONS went through a similar process initiated in January of 2008 which was 
validated in March 2008 and covered roughly the same amount of time.   
As part of the validation process, the BOD Board identified the Joint Nuclear, 
Biological, & Chemical Reconnaissance System, Increment 2 (JNBCRS2) program 
funding line, an existing program of record, as the source of funds for both JUONS.  The 
                                                 
83 James Hasik, ―Al-Qaeda doesn’t have a JCIDS process – thoughts about institutionalizing the rapid 
acquisition,‖ James Hasik Industrial Analysis for Global Security webpage, 
http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/2010/10/al-qaeda-doesnt-have-a-jcids-processthoughts-on-
institutionalizing-rapid-acquisition.html, 15 October 2010. 
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actual funding for the effort required reallocation of approximately 8.7 and 5.3 million 
procurement dollars from the FY07 and FY08 budgets, respectively.84 
2. Comparative Study 
When comparing the JUONS requirements validation process to the REF 
requirements generation process, it becomes clear that flexibility is a primary strength of 
the REF.  While traditional rapid initiatives must have a requirement validated through 
the JUONS process to initiate a UMR, the REF has the option to initiate a project based 
on one of several possible sources.  It could be a REF Director’s Initiative based on his 
assessment or information he has gained through interactions with Combatant 
Commanders, Senior Army Leadership, or deployed warfighters; it could be the result of 
the REF 10-Liner process generated by a forward deployed operational contact team; or, 
it could come through the traditional JUONS process.  These options allow the REF to 
apply a tiered approach based on the urgency and scope of the emerging need, while the 
traditional JUONS validation is bound to a rigid approval process with multiple layers of 
oversight regardless of the scope of the emerging need. The REF’s tiered approach 
provides a model for possibly introducing additional acquisition categories below ACAT 
III for rapid initiatives based on thresholds for the estimated funding requirements and 
the urgency of the need.  These tiers could determine the level of oversight and validation 
necessary in the JCIDS and DAS processes. 
Additionally, the REF’s flexibility to use the REF Director’s Initiative and the 
REF 10-Liner allows it to avoid the layers of bureaucracy associated with the JUONS 
process.  These requirements generation and validation processes only need to be 
approved by the Army DCS G-3/5/7 (Operations, Plans, and Training).  Recognizing that 
the reduced oversight may increase risk associated with the project, the REF developed 
their 10-Liner process as mitigation.  It was based on a streamlined version of the Army’s 
Operational Needs Statement and designed to succinctly and accurately capture the 
relevant information for the DCS G-3/5/7 to make an informed decision.  As mentioned 
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previously, the effectiveness of the REF 10-Liner practice has been recognized by the 
DoD LSS Rapid Acquisition Process Analysis Cross Functional Team as a potential best 
practice for use across the Services.  A process similar to the REF 10-Liner could aid in 
streamlining and standardizing the requesting units urgent need submission process and 
assist in the initial project classification to determine the level of oversight and validation 
necessary.  In order for such an arrangement to work, it is necessary to address 
organizational relationships. 
The REF has distinct organizational advantages over a traditional PM that are 
critical to the effectiveness of their requirements generation process.  Because of the 
operational nature of urgent needs, the REF has direct lines of communication to the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army and is aligned with the DCS G-3/5/7.  These relationships 
allow them to expedite requirements for high priority rapid initiatives, while traditional 
PMs do not even become a part of the requirements process until the JCB/JROC validate 
the requirement and the MDA for the project is identified.  The traditional process to 
identify the lead organization for the project requires additional coordination and 
planning and extends the overall time from the need submission to getting the capability 
to the warfighter.  Based on a tiered approach, the UMR process could be modified to 
include an additional path that allows a more direct path between the executing 
organization and the decision authorities in the requirements process.   
Additionally, because the REF contains requirements managers, or combat 
developers, and materiel developers as part of the same organization, they work together 
on a regular basis.  In some cases, a single person may be filling both roles, while the 
traditional Army combat developers and materiel developers are geographically and 
organizationally separated.  This separation increases difficulties associated with a lack of 
familiarity, a lack of communication, and conflicting priorities which results in an 
inefficient process.  A healthy, habitual relationship between the requirements managers 
and the materiel developers is critical during the early formation of the effort.  An LNO 
from the requirements manager’s organization within the materiel developer’s 
organization or an LNO from the materiel developer’s organization with the requirements 
manager’s organization could help to bridge existing geographical and organizational 
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divides.  The forward deployed operational contact teams are another example of how the 
REF has adapted their organization to streamline the process. 
As organic assets, the REF’s forward deployed operational contact teams provide 
a direct link to operational units.  Their role in the REF organization increases awareness 
of emerging urgent needs and expedites the requirements refinement phase of the 
materiel solutions development process, whereas the traditional JUONS- UMR process 
relies on operational units to elevate the emerging need through the formal channels.  
While the REF’s operational contact teams are familiar with their 10-Liner process, 
operational units usually have had limited exposure, if any, to the JUONS process.  This 
directly affects the initiation of the validation process, and it can contribute to delays in 
fulfilling the need.  As the role of the REF decreases, there is an opportunity for the 
requirements management community to leverage the practices and existing organization 
of the REF’s operational contact teams.  The REF’s operational contact teams could 
become organic assets as part of TRADOC to provide a direct line of communication 
from the field with the necessary expertise and experience to streamline the process. 
Finally, the budget for the UMR came from an existing funding line.  These funds 
were initially budgeted as part of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process 
and were not programmed for the UMR project.  As such, they had to be reallocated from 
other programmed efforts which resulted in de-scoping and delays of the follow-on 
increments of the JNBCRS2 program.  REF projects are generally funded with 
supplemental appropriations.  While this may not be a sustainable method of funding, it 
provides a model for developing a method that could be used during contingency 
operations without disrupting current force modernization efforts.  The Defense Science 
Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs also recognized this 
issue.  They recommended that the Executive and Legislative branches establish a 
separate fund for rapid acquisition and fielding.85  Such a fund could provide an avenue 
to initiate projects quickly while the longer term funding necessary to sustain the 
capability would be handled after the project transitioned to a program of record.  This 
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would reduce the amount of bureaucracy involved at project initiation and allow it to 
proceed into materiel solution development more quickly. 
C. MATERIEL SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS-DAS 
1. UMR Case 
The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO 
CBD) was designated as the Milestone Decision Authority for the efforts to field 
equipment sets in support of these two JUONS.  They were consolidated under the 
JNBCRS 2 program lead by the JPM NBC CA who partnered with the Edgewood 
Chemical Biological Center’s (ECBC) Advanced Design & Manufacturing (ADM) 
Division.  The project team executed the UMR process for the effort. 
To balance responsiveness with cost risk, the subsequent JNBCRS 2 program 
acquisition strategy consisted of a three phased incremental evolutionary approach.  The 
first phase, and the focus of this analysis, was to field equipment sets in support of these 
two JUONS, and it was designated as the JUONS Phase.  This phase represents an 
entirely government in-house approach utilizing COTS/GOTS equipment.  The next two 
phases were designated as the Dismounted Reconnaissance Sets, Kits, and Outfits (DR-
SKO) Phase and the Monitoring & Survey Sets, Kits, and Outfits (MS-SKO) Phase.  The 
approach with the DR-SKO Phase is also a COTS/GOTS system, but it builds on the 
capabilities and increases the robustness of the JUONS Phase equipment.  It will extend 
the dismounted reconnaissance capability through the rest of the force with the 
opportunity to update the JUONS systems with the equipment from DR-SKO.  The MS-
SKO Phase will be a developmental effort that incorporates technologies and capabilities 
that do not exist in currently available COTS/GOTS items.  Although the actual 
effectiveness and efficiency of the evolutionary approach is worth studying, 86 this 
analysis makes the assumption that the approach is valid for this situation. 
The JUONS equipment sets were sized for squad-level operations and, as 
previously mentioned, were comprised of COTS and GOTS products.  These products 
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were integrated into transportable, environmentally-controlled quadruple container 
(quadcon) shipping containers.   These equipment sets provide dismounted warfighters 
and homeland defenders in select U.S. Army Chemical units of the Active and Reserve 
Components with a CBRN reconnaissance capability that provides commanders with 
battlefield and event awareness. 
The JPM’s JUONS program divided the timeline (Figure 11) for the effort into 
four distinct phases (Design, Test, Field, and Sustain) with key decision points scheduled 
to initiate the Design and Fielding phases.  The total time between the JUONS validation 
and the initial fielding decision was about 14 months.  The total time to field the 16 
equipment sets was an additional 12 months.   
 
 
Figure 11. JUONS Phase Schedule87 
a. Requirements Analysis 
As part of their systems engineering (SE) process, the first step for the 
JPM NBC CA was to conduct a requirements analysis.  In order to fully understand the 
user’s needs, the JPM conducted numerous meetings with representatives from both 
NORTHCOM and V Corps.  That process allowed the JPM to thoroughly derive the 
user’s requirements which were subsequently decomposed into system functional 
requirements and specific pieces of equipment were allocated to those functional 
requirements.   
Although this is a similar process to the stakeholder requirement definition 
of the traditional DAS process, the workforce in the JPM that executed the JUONS phase 
lacked experience in the planning and execution of the UMR process.  The opportunity to 
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execute this type of effort occurs infrequently, so they had to learn the process and 
determine how to execute it as the program developed. 
As the JUONS phase dealt directly with operational units, the JPM 
deliberately chose a uniformed service member as the lead for the effort.  Even though 
this created a natural connection with his counterparts in the operational units and 
increased warfighter confidence in the process, the JPM had to reorganize to create the 
JUONS team and develop working relationships with the users to accomplish these tasks.  
Ultimately, the requirements refinement process consumed four of the six months of the 
design stage of the Materiel Solution Phase.   
b. Materiel Solution 
Because the effort was designated as a UMR, the materiel solution process 
was abbreviated.  Unlike a traditional ACAT III effort seeking a full materiel release, the 
JUONS UMR requirements for an MDA decision were limited.  As directed in AR 700-
142 Table 4-4 Urgent Materiel Release Documentation Requirements, the only 
documents required for presentation to the MDA for this effort were:  1) the JUONS from 
the user, 2) a safety and health hazard assessment88, 3) the PM request for acceptance 
from the requestor, and 4) the requestor’s acceptance statement.  The airworthiness 
certification and EOD supportability statement were not applicable to this effort. 
After the pieces of equipment were selected for the system, they had to be 
assessed for safety and health hazards individually and as a system.  Additionally, an 
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support the MDAs UMR fielding decision.  The test and evaluation required for this 
assessment involved developmental testing and an operational assessment performed by 
ATEC.89
,90   
Test and evaluation activities are generally resource intensive, and this 
portion of the JUONS Phase required an additional six months of effort after the 
COTS/GOTS were selected for the system.  The JPM originally planned for three months 
to accomplish this phase, but several factors contributed to extending that time.  
Specifically, the JPM misjudged the amount of funding and time required to complete the 
necessary testing for COTS and GOTS items; and subsequently, the JPM underestimated 
the coordination requirements with the test agency, the availability of test facilities, and 
the difficulty associated with coordination of warfighters for the operational 
assessment.91  The OCO deployment operational tempo complicated the coordination of 
warfighter test players. 
The operational assessment and developmental testing were successfully 
completed in August and September of 2008, respectively, which allowed the JPM to 
request acceptance from both NORTHCOM and V Corps in October 2008.92
,93  Those 
requests led to the acceptance statements from both units, and that completed the 
requirements necessary to return to the MDA for permission to continue with the limited 
fielding. 
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2. Comparative Study 
a. Requirements Analysis 
As discussed, the JPM relied on traditional acquisition experiences for 
conducting their requirements analysis.  Across the JPM, the processes associated with 
requirements analysis are traditionally ill-defined and not readily repeatable.  In some 
respects this is by design.  It allows flexibility and tailoring to an individual program, but 
it also creates variability and reduces efficiency as it depends heavily on the experience 
of the systems engineers conducting the requirements analysis.  As part of their effort to 
create efficiency and streamline the process, the REF developed their METT-TC-FLARS 
process.  This process helps to ensure an accelerated, repeatable, and thorough analysis of 
the critical aspects of the requirements and a uniform approach to each project.  It creates 
consistency in the analysis and the ensuing recommendations to the REF Director.  The 
METT-TC-FLARS process could be used to develop a similar process to standardize 
requirements analysis practices for UMRs.  The use of LNOs with the operational units is 
another best practice of the REF that could pay dividends. 
Recognizing the importance of the needs of the end user, the REF has 
LNOs deployed forward to provide a direct link to the operational units.  This creates a 
significant advantage for clarifying requirements and resolving issues during materiel 
solution development.  As demonstrated by the JUONS case, traditional acquisition 
organizations like the JPM are not organized to provide that type of connectivity with the 
operational units.  It becomes an ad hoc responsibility of one of the JPM team members 
to interact with the requesting unit.  This type of relationship takes time to develop, and 
the personnel take time to gain the experience necessary to be effective in the role.  One 
solution could be to establish an organization of REF-like LNOs that have a habitual 





Command (RDECOM) Field Assistance in Science and Technology (R-FAST) 94
,95teams 
are another example of how this approach might work to support the materiel solution 
development. 
b. Materiel Solution 
The JPM and ECBC were effective with the design synthesis process of 
the materiel solution development.  The most significant challenges occurred during the 
previously discussed requirements analysis process and the test and evaluation process.  
During this analysis it is important to understand that REF projects often receive the 
latitude to defer some elements of the test and evaluation desired for the fielding of an 
item, aside from safety.  This occurs because REF projects are equipping efforts and not 
fielding efforts, and the expectation is that they will be more thoroughly tested if they 
come back through the CDRT process for fielding.  Traditional UMRs like the JNBCRS 
2 JUONS effort are limited fielding efforts, and the increased risk of fielding an item with 
deferred demonstration of operational effectiveness and suitability substantially reduces 
the latitude of a UMR.  
While REF projects complete a very limited amount of developmental and 
operational testing before they can be delivered to the warfighter for use, the JNBCRS 2 
JUONS program was required to complete a more thorough battery of developmental and 
operational testing which included an OA conducted with warfighters.  The REF 
negotiates the level of testing with ATEC on a project-by-project basis in accordance 
with the urgency, technical maturity level of the item and equipping plan, while there is 
little, if any, latitude for UMR programs to negotiate because of the risks associated with 
a fielding.  One possible solution is to create guidelines based on the tiered approach to 
establish a starting point for negotiating an appropriate level of testing based on the scope 
of the UMR program.  The amount necessary could be tailored based on the urgency, 
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technical maturity level and cost risk associated with the materiel solution.  Early 
involvement from ATEC would be critical for this approach. 
The REF has resident ATEC LNOs as part of their organization to 
facilitate timely planning and execution of testing efforts.  These ATEC LNOs participate 
in the daily updates to the REF Director which gives them insight into the current and 
planned projects.  It allows them to provide test expertise during planning, and it gives 
them the information necessary to coordinate test activities and requirements with the 
appropriate test agency and test facilities early in the process.  This test expertise is 
essential to assuring that delays due to testing requirements are minimized.  
Unfortunately, the JPM does not have an ATEC LNO that resides in their office.  There is 
an ATEC LNO that resides at the JPEO headquarters, but this ATEC LNO is expected to 
cover seven JPMs that are spread across the country.  Although most program test 
engineers are aware of the ATEC LNO’s presence, the ATEC LNO is underutilized 
because there are not clearly established practices to make effective use of his services.  
An increased presence of ATEC LNOs with clearly defined roles within the PEOs and 
PMs and guidelines for the planning and execution of necessary test and evaluation 
activities for UMRs could result in a much more efficient process.  TDEs after the unit is 
equipped are another tool that could help to streamline test and evaluation requirements. 
The in-theater ATEC FOA team assessments are an additional resource 
occasionally available to the REF.  As discussed previously, the ATEC FOA teams 
conduct TDEs which can be used to update C&L reports and improve suitability data.  
These events can provide essential information to Army leadership and acquisition 
decision makers for disposition determination of the items.  The TDEs can also provide a 
means to follow up on systems that are rapidly ―equipped‖ with deferred testing and 
expand the user’s knowledge of materiel capabilities and limitations.  These teams are a 
scarce but valuable resource.  The likelihood of a UMR receiving their services is low 
without a significant amount of coordination and high visibility of the project because of 
the scarcity of the resource.  An increase in the size of the ATEC FOA teams or increased 
visibility and prioritization of UMR programs for TDEs could facilitate more efficient 
use of this capability and result in quicker equipping of the gaining command.   
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Another organizational advantage is the designation of the REF Director 
as the decision authority.   This arrangement reduces layers of bureaucracy necessary to 
make programmatic decisions.  The direct lines of communication to Army leadership 
and the linkage to the semiannual program reviews with the AAE allow the REF Director 
to operate with authority while maintaining accountability.  This structure gives the 
project leaders access to the decision authority on a daily basis.  Conversely, the MDA 
for the JNBCRS2 JUONS is the JPEO CBD.  Most interactions with the JPEO are 
formalized because of the range of his responsibilities.  Formal reviews and decision 
briefs are generally staffed through the product manager, project manager, and JPEO staff 
prior to briefing the MDA.  These layers of bureaucracy create significant delays and 
long processing and approval times for any required documentation or programmatic 
decisions and reduce the responsiveness of the UMR process.  Based on a tiered 
approach, some decision authority and accountability should be pushed down to the 
product and project manager level.  The level of decision authority should be based on 
the associated urgency, technical maturity level and cost risk associated with the effort. 
In addition to the organizational advantages, the REF also has advantages 
in the composition of its workforce.  The REF workforce is intentionally staffed with 
active duty and civilian personnel with operational military experience.  This experience 
positions them to make critical decisions in a timely manner while considering the needs 
of the warfighter.  It also gives them significant credibility with the operational 
community.  The JNBCRS2 JUONS team recognized the value of that credibility as well.  
As a result, the JPM appointed a uniformed service member as the JUONS team leader.  
Although this served the program well, there are a limited number of military acquisition 
professionals in the JPM.  The majority of the JPM workforce does not have military 
experience or an operational background, so there is not enough of that perspective to 
spread around the organization.  One solution could be to increase the number of military 
acquisition professionals with operational experience within the PM organizations.   




interacting with operational organizations.  This could be accomplished through 
developmental assignments and tailored training focused on the operational forces that 
the PM supports. 
As a final point in the materiel solution development, one of the most 
significant advantages the REF workforce owns is their experience level with rapid 
initiatives.  The REF workforce has the benefit of specializing in rapid projects.  They 
have become subject matter experts in their processes, while traditional PM employees 
have very limited opportunities to execute rapid projects.  The JPM workforce faced an 
extremely steep learning curve which was most evident in the requirements analysis and 
testing of the system.  There were decisions and assumptions made that adversely 
affected the duration of the program due to the inexperience of not only the JPM 
workforce, but also the MDA, contracting officers, and evaluators  The infrequent 
occurrence of UMRs and the inexperience that followed not only affected the duration of 
the program but the deployment of the system as well.  Because it is not practical to rely 
on increased opportunities to execute rapid projects to build these skills, it is critical to 
capture the experiences and process of organizations like the REF.  That knowledge must 
be used to develop repeatable processes that traditional PM organizations can execute.  It 
would also be beneficial to maintain a rapid cell as a center of excellence that can execute 
projects and serve to advice and guide traditional organizations executing rapid 
acquisition projects.  
D. DEPLOYMENT 
1. UMR Case 
a. Deployment 
The deployment stage of the JUONS phase consisted of the coordination 
for fielding and conducting the New Equipment Training (NET) necessary to get the 
equipment into the hands of the users.  Even though this only represented 16 sets of 
equipment and the JUONS team leveraged the JPM NET fielding team, the complexity of 
the effort required almost a full year to complete.  This process was exacerbated by 
unanticipated operator certification requirements for elements of the personal protective 
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equipment and a large number of man-machine interfaces that required training for the 
COTS items.  Again, this was an example of learning the complexity of rapid fielding 
initiatives as the program developed. 
b. Transition 
The transition of these equipment sets required a sustainment strategy to 
keep the systems viable until the DR-SKO could be fielded and a more permanent and 
appropriate sustainment approach could be implemented.  The interim support strategy 
makes use of an umbrella CBRN Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract that began 
in December 2008.96 
2. Comparative Study 
a. Deployment 
The strength of the REF during the Deployment phase is again the result 
of their organizational structure and the experience of its workforce.  They are organized 
to be self-sufficient for system deployment with specialized cells to conduct warehouse 
operations, shipping and delivery, and training.  These cells have the same advantages of 
repetition and experience as the materiel solution development workforce because their 
role is specific to the deployment of rapid initiatives.  In this case, the NET team 
executing JUONS deployment had the same benefit of specificity.  They were 
accustomed to traveling to the gaining unit to deliver systems and conduct NET for 
traditional acquisition items.  As previously discussed, their difficulties were based on the 
unanticipated training requirements and the large number of systems associated with the 
program.  As stated in the assessment in the materiel solution development section, the 
logistics community should consider maintaining the REF logistics group as a center of 
excellence for the fielding of urgent needs.  This group could provide guidance on the 
intricacies of urgent need system deployment to traditional PM logisticians. 
                                                 
96 Interview by the authors with Major Scott Schroer, JNBCRS2 Team Lead, and the JNBCRS2 
Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, July-October 2010.  
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b. Transition   
Similar to the deployment phase, the REF practices and processes for the 
transition of the items to the gaining command did not provide an appreciable advantage 
over the JPMs activities.  The JPM experience with sustainment planning translated well 
to the JUONS program. 
E. SUMMARY 
This comparison of the JNBCRS2 UMR effort and the established REF processes 
provided valuable insight into aspects of the REFs rapid acquisition practices that could 
enhance areas within the UMR process.  It provides a prime example of the need for 
guidance and procedures in addition to policy.  Without it, the JPM NBC CA was forced 
to interpret the UMR policies and determine how to implement them resulting in 
significant challenges.  These analyses identify REF lessons learned, potential immediate 
improvements to the UMR process, and areas that deserve further study.  The final 
chapter examines the research questions and captures the conclusions and 
recommendations that resulted from this case study and the research of the REF rapid 
acquisition process.    
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since World War II, a variety of approaches have been employed to speed the 
acquisition process during each of the nation’s conflicts.  However, none of these efforts 
lasted beyond their initial implementation for a number of reasons.  First, rapid 
acquisition organizations lacked sufficient funding to continue their programs beyond 
procurement and fielding of the initial small number of systems or to allow transition of 
their projects to the regular acquisition process.  Second, as the immediate threats 
decreased, the number of urgent requests from the field also decreased, consequently, the 
need for rapid or streamlined acquisition decreased.  Because the warfighter was willing 
to wait for the materiel solutions, there was more time available and less incentive for the 
PM to assume the risks associated with streamlining the acquisition process.  In other 
words, schedule became less important than cost and performance.  Finally, oversight, 
control, politics and the necessity to defend systems and their budgets took control of the 
process. 
One of the DAPA findings was that the Department must be agile—to an 
unprecedented degree—to respond quickly to urgent operational needs from across the 
entire spectrum of potential conflicts.  Consequently, during the last decade, the Army 
has utilized a number of processes to equip units participating in OCO with new systems 
to increase the capability of deployed forces. The REF is one initiative that demonstrated 
some effective rapid acquisition processes that could be implemented as part of 
traditional acquisition, especially as part of the UMR process.  
This chapter is broken down into two major sections.  The first examines the 
primary and secondary research questions, providing a brief examination of each.  The 
second section provides conclusions and recommendations derived from the analysis. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The contingency funding that the REF relies on to execute its mission is not 
sustainable.  As that funding source diminishes with the planned draw downs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is highly likely that the REF organization’s role will also diminish.  
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Before that happens, there is an opportunity to examine the processes and practices the 
REF has developed over that last eight years of operation to determine how they might be 
leveraged to enhance our existing acquisition processes and practices.  
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary purpose of this research was to capture the REF’s processes, 
practices and lessons learned to answer the following question: 
What Army REF processes, practices and lessons learned should be 
considered by the Army within its streamlined acquisition process—
Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) Process—to increase responsiveness 
to the warfighter? 
The REF has effectively utilized processes and practices created to manage the 
urgent need requests from the field using existing policy.  The Case Study and Analysis 
Chapter provided the comparative analysis of the REF process and practices identified in 
the Process Chapter and a UMR case to identify those processes, practices and lessons 
learned that merit consideration.  As a result of that comparative analysis, the authors 
came to set of conclusions and recommendations to improve the execution of streamlined 
acquisitions which focused on innovative methods the REF used for identifying 
capability requirements, analyzing and validating the requirements, producing materiel 
solutions and deploying those solutions to the battlefield expediently.  Some of the key 
REF practices, such as the REF 10-Liner to capture urgent requirements in the field, 
METT-C-FLARS to analyze the requirement, the REF Binning Methodology for 
categorizing and prioritizing projects, and the BLITZ COP for tracking project status, 
heavily influenced the  conclusions and recommendations summarized in Figure 12.  
Additionally, the REF concept for using integrated product teams and liaison officers to 
bring key stakeholders (User, Acquisition and T&E community) together as a team to 
increase responsiveness to the warfighter is another major theme of the conclusions and 
recommendations.  A more in-depth discussion of the conclusions that lead to those 
recommendations will follow in the final section of this chapter.  
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STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROCESS 
IMPROVEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Requirements—JCIDS 
 Create tiered categories below the ACAT 
III designation within JCIDS for rapid 
initiatives.  Classify the tiers according to 
thresholds for the estimated cost and 
urgency of the acquisition effort and 
designate the levels of oversight and 
validation necessary. 
 Incorporate a process similar to the REF 
10-Liner to streamline and standardize 




 Develop rapid initiative specific guidance 
based on the REF’s METT-TC-FLARS 
process to create a streamlined, repeatable 
process for conducting requirements 
analysis. 
 Tailor the amount of testing and associated 
OA based on the urgency, technical 
maturity level and cost risk associated with 
the system(s) based on the tiered approach 
with more robust follow-on testing planned 
to confirm the effectiveness, suitability and 
survivability of the system(s).  
 Incorporate TDEs conducted by the ATEC 
FOA teams as a risk reduction measure for 
the tiered approach provide forward 
operational assessments as part of the 
robust follow-on testing. 
 Develop a standardized COP/project 
management system to provide situational 
awareness and visibility of projects across 
the three major acquisition systems 
(JCIDS, DAS, PPBES).   
 
Budget—PPBE 
 Establish a specific funding line for rapid 
acquisition projects that is not tied to 
specific ―colors‖ of money. 
 Develop funding threshold criteria that 
align with the tiered approach. 
Workforce 
 Increase the number of military acquisition 
professionals in PM organizations and 
develop a corps of civilian employees that 
has experience interacting with operational 
organizations. 
 Maintain a rapid cell as a center of 
excellence that can advise and guide 
traditional acquisition organizations and 
provide training to PMs during rapid 
projects. 
 Develop a core of subject matter experts in 
contracting for rapid acquisition projects. 
 
Organization 
 Reduce the level of decision authority and 
oversight for urgent needs projects based 
on a tiered approach organized according 
to the associated technical maturity level 
and cost risk of the effort. 
 Incorporate LNOs from the requirements 
community into the PM offices to develop 
habitual relationships.  
 Increase the number of ATEC LNOs 
within the PMs to increase the efficiency 
of test and evaluation activities. 
 Transfer the operational contact team 
approach to the requirements community 
to increase responsiveness to emerging 
needs by reducing the lines of 
communication from the warfighter to the 
requirements community and increase 
efficiency for accurately capturing the 
information required to make informed 
decisions.  Additionally, these teams 
should maintain habitual relationships with 
the PMs. 
 Maintain the REF logistics group as a 
center of excellence for the fielding of 
urgent needs to provide guidance on the 
intricacies of urgent need system 
deployment to traditional PM logisticians. 
 
 
Figure 12. Streamlined Acquisition Process Improvement Recommendations 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
In addition to the primary research question, this research addressed three 
secondary questions.  The first question focused on the existing policies in place for rapid 
acquisition. 
a) Does the Army have clear policies and guidelines in 
place regarding management of rapid acquisition 
items? 
As evidenced by the summaries in the Policies Chapter, there are existing 
policies in place to allow rapid acquisition activities.  Unfortunately, even though both 
the DoDI 5000.02 and AR 70-1 have been updated since the beginning of the current 
OCO, they still do not provide definitive guidance and procedures.  While the current 
policies allow for flexibility, this approach creates variability in effectiveness and 
responsiveness because each executor has to develop their own processes to implement 
those policies.  As discussed in the Case Study and Analysis Chapter, if an organization 
is not experienced with rapid projects, the time required to interpret policy and determine 
how to execute within it reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of the project in terms 
of responsiveness. 
The second question focuses on the REF processes that have evolved over 
the last eight years of execution. 
b) What processes has the REF implemented to ensure 
responsiveness? 
The REF has incorporated the same tenet that the DAPA Panel presented 
in regards to delivering military capability.  They both embrace the idea that 
developmental programs must change from a focus on 100 percent performance in the 
first production lot to focus on delivering useful military capability to reduce schedule.  
Since its inception, the REF has evolved its processes to maximize responsiveness while 
operating within existing policy.  These processes represent a microcosm of the three 
major systems involved in the acquisition of DoD equipment:  JCIDS, DAS, and PPBE.  
They cover their requirements generation process; their materiel solution development 
and equipping processes; and their funding process.  The Process Chapter documents 
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these processes and while highlighting REF unique practices such as the REF 10-Liner 
requirements generation form, their project binning system, the METT-TC-FLARS 
requirements analysis process, and the BLITZ COP for tracking project status.  
Additionally, the chapter provides the basis for comparison and analysis to answer the 
final question. 
This question provides the impetus to compare those REF processes and 
practices to an actual UMR case for analysis to answer the main research question. 
c) How do REF processes and practices compare to a 
streamlined acquisition case? 
This project compared the REF processes and practices with the JNBCRS 
UMR case to identify possible areas for improvement.  The Case Study and Analysis 
Chapter conducted the comparative analysis and identified that the REF’s processes and 
practices do provide some potentially significant advantages or insights into areas ripe for 
improvement.  Specifically, the REF requirements generation and validation processes 
and practices are notably more flexible with less bureaucratic oversight than the JUONs 
process.  Additionally, the REF has evolved their processes for requirements analysis and 
materiel solution development to ensure repeatability and responsiveness, while the 
streamlined acquisition case required a major on-the-job learning curve for the PM due to 
a lack of definitive guidance or procedures.  The REF also held a considerable advantage 
over the PM in the case due to their workforce composition and experience, as well as 
their organizational structure and alignment.  Their workforce had the benefit of 
experience because they specialized in rapid equipping projects.  The practice of 
developing a REF workforce composed of employees with operational experience 
provided insight and understanding of the user requirements that were not readily 
apparent to the PM workforce.  Furthermore, the REF was organized to leverage liaisons 
and forward deployed elements as part of its core team while the PM had to rely on 
existing relationships with key stakeholders that are separated geographically and 
organizationally.  And finally, the REF was organizationally aligned with key decision 
makers in a manner that allowed them to expedite critical decisions.  The PM used their 
traditional channels for key decisions through their MDA which slowed their process.  A 
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discussion of how these potential advantages might be applied to the streamlined Army 
acquisition process is presented in more detail as part of the conclusions and 
recommendations below. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions and recommendations are organized to build on the framework 
of categories established in the DAPA Report:  Requirements, Acquisition, Budget, 
Workforce, and Organization.  Even though the operational tempo of the war has raised 
industry interest in the development of technologies for the DoD, the industry category 
was not assessed as part of this research paper because the analysis did not identify any 
significant advantages in the way the REF worked with industry on rapid projects when 
compared to the UMR case study. 
1. Requirements—JCIDS 
Our assessment is that the current requirements process does not 
meet the needs of the current security environment or the standards 
of a successful acquisition process. 
 –The DAPA Panel97 
 
The JCIDS requirements process is a top down driven, sequential process.  It 
provides a deliberate method for identifying and defining new capabilities required to 
defeat threats to our national security which ensures that any new requirement is well 
defined and is integrated into an overall warfighting capability that supports the national 
defense strategy.  This process ensures that the DoD makes informed decisions as new 
requirements compete for priority and funding with existing capabilities and other new 
requirements and chooses the most effective technologies to meet the warfighter’s needs.  
However, it is not designed to respond rapidly to emerging needs or requirements coming 
from the bottom up.  To that end, there are policies in place to allow for bottom up 
requirements to meet urgent needs.   
                                                 
97 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Project, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) Report, January 2006, 35-36.  
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Most of the comments that the DAPA Panel received concerning JCIDS found it 
too complex, with little value in defining capabilities that require Materiel Solutions.  In 
addition, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on acquisition reform found that 
the ―current system for satisfying Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) works best 
when it is being directly tasked by the Secretary of Defense‖98; however, it is not feasible 
for the Secretary of Defense to personally participate on all JUONs.  Additionally, it is a 
―one size fits all‖ approach that must follow the CJCSI 3470.01 guidance which is time 
consuming and requires participation from the J-8, JRAC, JCB, FCB, and BOD.  
Although this level of validation may be appropriate to manage high risk and high cost 
efforts, it is not efficient for smaller efforts with lower risk. 
As discussed in the analysis, the REF requirements validation process is more 
flexible than the JUON process.  It allows the REF Director, with technical information 
gathered by his team and the oversight of the Army G-3/5/7 and the AAE, to determine 
and approve requirements.  Because of this process the REF has been effective in 
maintaining focus and being responsive to the urgent need at hand.   
Additionally, the REF’s binning system provides a model for a tiered approach 
for categories below the ACAT III designation for rapid initiatives.  These tiers could be 
used to establish the priority of the effort and levels of oversight and validation necessary 
in the requirements generation process.  Thresholds based on the estimated cost of the 
acquisition effort and the urgency of the need could determine the associated tier for the 
project to maximize responsiveness while minimizing the risk associated with the effort. 
 Recommendation: 
 Create categories below the ACAT III designation for rapid initiatives to 
support a tiered approach in the JCIDS.  The tiers could be similar to the 
REF’s binning system and could be classified according to thresholds for 
the estimated cost of the acquisition effort and the urgency of the need.  
The designated tier could determine the levels of oversight and validation 
necessary in the requirements generation process. 
Currently, the methods to generate urgent needs vary by Service.  These processes 
are not well defined or understood by the submitting organizations which results in 
                                                 
98 House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Findings and 
Recommendations, March 23, 2010. 
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varying degrees of effectiveness when communicating the need and ensuring validation 
of the requirement.  The REF has developed their REF 10-Liner to standardize and 
simplify this process.  It was based on a streamlined version of the Army’s Operational 
Needs Statement and designed to succinctly and accurately capture the relevant 
information to facilitate an informed decision.  The effectiveness of the REF 10-Liner 
practice has been recognized by the DoD LSS Rapid Acquisition Process Analysis Cross 
Functional Team as a potential best practice for use across the Services. 
 Recommendation: 
 Incorporate a process similar to the REF 10-Liner to streamline and 
standardize the requesting units’ submission process and aid in the project 
classification.  
2. Acquisition—DAS 
The Department of Defense’s one size fits all acquisition program 
structure does not meet the diverse capability and rapid time of 
delivery needs that are typical of a rapidly changing security 
environment. 
–The DAPA Panel99 
 
The first steps in the acquisition process after the requirements are generated and 
validated is the requirements analysis process.  In the case study, the JPM’s requirements 
analysis process relied upon traditional acquisition practices and experiences that were 
ill-defined and not readily repeatable which created variability and reduced efficiency.  
The REF’s METT-TC-FLARS process facilitates an accelerated, repeatable, and 
thorough analysis of the critical aspects of the requirements and a uniform approach to 
each project.  This could serve as a model to develop a similar process to standardize 
requirements analysis practices for UMRs. 
                                                 
99 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Project, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) Report, January 2006, 48. 
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 Recommendation: 
 Develop rapid initiative specific guidance based on the REF’s METT-TC-
FLARS process to create a streamlined, repeatable process for conducting 
requirements analysis. 
After the requirements analysis process, the PM experienced some of their most 
significant challenges with test and evaluation activities.  Once again, it is important to 
recognize the distinctions between the REF’s equipping activities and the UMR fielding 
activities, but the practices that the REF developed with ATEC are worth leveraging for 
UMRs where possible and appropriate.  
Although there were different levels of fidelity between developmental and 
operational testing of REF projects and the UMR case study because of the equipping 
versus fielding distinction, the latitude afforded to the REF projects allowed them to be 
more responsive when time was a critical constraint.  To create consistency in the testing 
of UMR programs and still maintain flexibility, it should be possible for the PM to 
negotiate the level of testing required with ATEC on a project-by-project basis in 
accordance with the urgency, technical maturity level of the item and fielding plan.  The 
creation of a set of guidelines based on the tiered approach would establish a starting 
point for negotiating an appropriate level of testing tailored to the urgency, technical 
maturity level and cost risk associated with the proposed materiel solution.  This would 
allow the acquisition community to do the minimum amount of T&E necessary to get the 
item to the warfighter while planning to do more robust follow-on T&E.  The early 
involvement from ATEC would be critical for this approach, and the ATEC Mission 
Based Test and Evaluation (MBTE)100 initiative provides an opportunity to facilitate that 
early involvement. 
                                                 
100 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command Interim Policy Guidance 10-5, Mission Based Test and 
Evaluation (MBT&E), 2010. 
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Recommendation: 
 Tailor the amount of testing and associated OA in accordance with the 
urgency, technical maturity level and cost risk associated with the 
system(s) based on the tiered approach with more robust follow-on testing 
planned to confirm the effectiveness, suitability and survivability of the 
system(s).  Guidelines could be developed to help define acceptable 
amounts of test and evaluation based on the project classification. 
TDEs after the unit is equipped are one method to execute the follow-on testing.  
The in-theater ATEC FOA team assessments are a resource that could conduct TDEs to 
update C&L reports and improve suitability data.  These events could provide the 
essential information Army leadership and acquisition decision makers need for 
disposition determinations of the items.  The TDEs provide a means to follow-up on 
rapidly ―equipped‖ systems with deferred testing to expand the user’s knowledge of 
materiel capabilities and limitations.   
Recommendation: 
 Incorporate TDEs conducted by the ATEC FOA teams as a risk reduction 
measure for the tiered approach provide forward operational assessments 
as part of the robust follow-on testing. 
Although it was not discussed in the analysis chapter, the REF’s knowledge 
management system (BLITZ) provides a common operating picture with automated 
reporting.   Unlike the Department of the Army Equipment Common Operating Picture 
(ECOP) which is a web-based database for requesting and sourcing ONSs, BLITZ is a 
unique capability developed specifically for the REF to provide the ability to visualize 
the project from ―cradle-to-grave.‖  BLITZ was necessary because of the complexities of 
the business systems involved in rapid initiatives.  Those same complexities are 
multiplied in traditional acquisitions, and there is no standardized system to provide 
leadership with situational awareness and visibility.  This type of system could assist in 
the synchronization of critical events and status monitoring of key documents in major 
acquisition programs as well as rapid initiatives across the three major acquisition 
systems (JCIDS, DAS, PPBES). 
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 Recommendation: 
 Develop a standardized COP/project management system to provide 
situational awareness and visibility of projects across the three major 
acquisition systems (JCIDS, DAS, PPBES).  The REF’s Blitz could be 
used as a starting point for identifying functionality requirements. 
3. Budget—PPBES 
Where’s the money? That stovepipe tends to operate independently of 
the requirements…to say that they are integrated is an overstatement. 
 
–Dr. James I. Finley 101 
 
In addition to requirements generation and acquisition activities, funding for 
urgent needs is problematic.  Our current PPBES is tied to long range planning for 
programs based on the POM cycle.  Unless there is contingency funding available, the 
cumbersome process of reprogramming funds is necessary to fund urgent needs.  
Although this process is effective for forcing accountability and the balancing of budgets, 
it has a negative effect on responsiveness.  
In the case study and analysis, the funding for the UMR came as a result of the 
reprogramming process while REF projects are generally funded with supplemental 
appropriations.  The Defense Science Board Task Force recognized this issue and 
recommended the establishment of a separate fund for rapid acquisition and fielding.102  
Such a fund could provide an avenue to initiate projects quickly while the longer term 
funding necessary to sustain the capability would be handled after the project transitioned 
to a program of record.  This would reduce the amount of bureaucracy involved at project 
initiation and allow it to proceed into materiel solution development more quickly. 
                                                 
101 Dr. James I. Finley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), ―Pushing 
for a Sense of Urgency,‖ Defense AT&L Magazine, Nov-Dec 2006. 
102 Defense Science Board Task Force, ―Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the 
Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs,‖ July 2009, 32-33. 
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 Recommendation: 
 Establish a specific funding line for rapid acquisition projects that is not 
tied to specific ―colors‖ of money to allow spending flexibility to meet 
urgent needs. 
Because the REF has the flexibility to choose which projects they will execute, a 
major decision criterion is funding.  The level of funding directly affects the level of 
contracting activities that is required, and the level of contracting activities is directly 
related to the timeliness of the project.  Although the JNBCRS2 JUONS case study does 
not provide a good point of comparative analysis because of the associated procurement 
costs, it is still worth discussing the REF’s practices as they relate to funding levels.   
As stated by General Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, ―We have a 
procurement system that is exceedingly slow.  We have to find a way, with technologies 
changing so quickly, to speed up our procurement process, to be more nimble‖.103  To 
speed up the procurement process, the REF has identified certain funding levels as part of 
its binning process.  The REF will give higher priority to projects that can be executed 
under the limits that allow the use of the government purchase card.  The use of the 
purchase card allows the REF to minimize contracting activities whenever possible.  The 
next threshold is at $1M after which the level of contracting activities increases.  The 
REF is subject to the same contracting requirements as every other DoD organization, 
and regimented contracting processes with multiple layers of bureaucracy to reduce risk 
increase the execution time of the project.   
 
 Recommendation: 
 Develop funding thresholds based on contracting criteria that aligns with the 
previously recommended tiered approach for designated projects.  
 
                                                 
103 Erwin, Sandra, ―Army’s Vice Chief: We Have to Speed Up How We Buy Things,‖ National 
Defense Magazine, October 2009. 
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4. Workforce 
A successful program requires a professional workforce with subject 
matter expertise. 
The DAPA Panel104 
 
The experience level and background of the workforce executing rapid acquisition 
projects can be critical.  The composition and experience of the REF workforce provided 
them with a significant advantage for executing their mission effectively.  Intentionally 
staffing with active duty soldiers and civilian personnel with operational military 
experience positioned them to make critical decisions in a timely manner while 
considering the needs of the warfighter.  It also gave them significant credibility with 
their customers.  It’s not feasible to take that approach with the greater acquisition 
workforce, but the number of military acquisition professionals with operational 
experience within the PM organizations could be increased.  There could also be an 
increased emphasis on the development of a corps of civilian employees to give them 
experience interacting with operational organizations.  Developmental assignments to 
include participation as part of FOA teams and tailored training focused on the 
operational forces that the PM supports could be instrumental in accomplishing this 
objective. 
 Recommendation: 
 Increase the number of military acquisition professionals in the PM 
organizations and develop a corps of civilian employees that has 
experience interacting with operational organizations. 
The most significant advantage was the REF workforce experience level with 
rapid initiatives.  They have become subject matter experts because they specialize in 
rapid projects.  There was an extremely steep learning curve associated with the JPM’s 
execution of the UMR in the case study that resulted in inefficiencies and 
underestimating the impacts of certain decisions.  The infrequency of opportunities to 
execute UMRs will likely be a common issue for traditional PMs that execute future 
UMRs.  As it is not practical to rely on increased opportunities to execute rapid projects 
                                                 
104 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Project, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) Report, January 2006, 28. 
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to build these skills, it becomes essential to capture the experiences and process of 
organizations like the REF to develop repeatable processes that traditional PM 
organizations can execute.  Maintaining a rapid cell as a center of excellence that can 
execute projects and serve to advise and guide traditional organizations executing rapid 
acquisition projects will help to ensure this capability is sustained.  
 Recommendation: 
 Leverage the experiences and processes of the REF by maintaining a rapid 
cell as a center of excellence that can advise and guide traditional PMs 
during a rapid project. 
In response to the challenges associated with contracting activities, the REF 
recognized the need to have contracting professionals as a part of their workforce.  The 
REF has addressed contracting responsiveness problems through an agreement with the 
contracting office to dedicate seven employees to REF projects.  The REF approach will 
ensure that a group of contracting professionals develops core competencies in rapid 
projects.   
The contracting office has traditionally organized itself to support the PM through 
habitual relationships.  This approach works well for traditional acquisitions, but, 
unfortunately, the contracting support for the PM during rapid initiatives will have the 
same issues as the PM workforce because of a lack of opportunity.  The learning curve 
will be high for each project.  The contracting community should consider developing a 
rapid initiatives team that will gain experience and become subject matter experts on the 
common issues and best practices for rapid acquisitions.  
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 Recommendation: 
 Develop a core of subject matter experts in contracting for rapid 
acquisition projects. 
5. Organization 
Successful organizations have short, unambiguous lines of 
communication among levels of management, small staffs of highly 
competent professional personnel. 
–The Packard Commission, June 1986105 
 
In addition to the composition of their workforce, the REF has distinct 
organizational advantages over a traditional PM that significantly reduces their 
bureaucratic challenges.  The REF had direct lines of communication to key decision 
makers and authority and accountability are pushed down to the lowest level feasible.  
The REF Director acts as the decision authority with semiannual program reviews with 
the AAE to maintain accountability.  This provides a good model to incorporate into the 
suggested tiered approach to reduce the layers of bureaucracy associated with traditional 
UMR process.  The level of decision authority and oversight requirements in the tiered 
approach should be based on the associated urgency, technical maturity level and cost 
risk associated with the effort. 
Recommendation: 
 Reduce the level of decision authority and oversight for urgent needs 
projects based on a tiered approach organized according to the associated 
technical maturity level and cost risk of the effort. 
The REF use of requirements managers, or combat developers, and materiel 
developers as part of the same organization allows them to work together on a regular 
basis.  In some cases, a single person may be filling both roles, while the traditional 
Army combat developers and materiel developers are geographically and 
organizationally separated.  This separation increases difficulties associated with a lack of 
familiarity, a lack of communication, and conflicting priorities which results in an 
inefficient process.  Healthy, habitual relationships between the requirements managers 
and the materiel developers are critical during the early formation of the effort.  An LNO 
                                                 
105 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Project, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) report, January 2006, 24. 
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from the requirements manager’s organization within the materiel developer’s 
organization or an LNO from the materiel developer’s organization with the requirements 
manager’s organization could help to bridge existing geographical and organizational 
divides. 
Recommendation: 
 Incorporate LNOs from the requirements community into the PM offices 
to develop habitual relationships.  
The REF’s use of a resident ATEC LNOs as part of their organization facilitates 
timely planning and execution of testing efforts.  These ATEC LNOs participate in the 
daily updates to the REF Director which gives them insight into the current and planned 
projects which allows them to provide test expertise during planning.  Similar to MBTE, 
it focuses on early planning to provide the information necessary to coordinate test 
activities and requirements with the appropriate test agency and test facilities.  The JPM 
did not have a similar arrangement with ATEC.  Although there is an ATEC LNO that 
resides at the JPEO headquarters, this ATEC LNO is expected to cover seven JPMs that 
are spread across the country.  An increased presence of ATEC LNOs with clearly 
defined roles within the PEOs and PMs and guidelines for the planning and execution of 
necessary test and evaluation activities for UMRs could result in a much more efficient 
process.   
Recommendation: 
 Increase the number of ATEC LNOs within the PMs to increase the 
efficiency of test and evaluation activities.  
Forward deployed REF operational contact teams are another example of the 
REF’s effective use of LNOs.  They provide a direct link to the operational units which 
creates a significant advantage for clarifying requirements and resolving issues during 
materiel solution development.  Traditional acquisition organizations like the JPM are not 
organized to provide that type of connectivity with the operational units.  That 
connectivity becomes a responsibility of a JPM team member, and that type of 
relationship takes time to develop.  The establishment of an organization of forward 
deployed REF-like LNOs that have a habitual relationship with the PM offices could 
increase the effectiveness of traditional organizations executing rapid projects.  The 
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Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) Field Assistance in 
Science and Technology (R-FAST)106
,107 teams are another example of how this 
approach can be applied. 
As the role of the REF decreases, there is an opportunity for the requirements 
management community to leverage the practices and existing organization of the REF’s 
operational contact teams.  The REF’s operational contact teams could become organic 
assets as part of TRADOC to provide a direct line of communication from the field with 
the necessary expertise and experience to streamline the process. 
Recommendation: 
 Transfer the operational contact team approach to the requirements 
community to increase responsiveness to emerging needs by reducing the 
lines of communication from the warfighter to the requirements 
community and increase efficiency for accurately capturing the 
information required to make informed decisions.  Additionally, these 
teams should maintain habitual relationships with the PMs. 
During the Deployment phase, the experience of the REF workforce is again a 
major asset.   They are organized into self-sufficient cells that have the advantages of 
repetition and experience of the logistics workforce.  As previously discussed in the 
materiel solution development and deployment sections of the analysis, the logistics 
community should consider maintaining the REF logistics group as a center of excellence 
for the fielding of urgent needs.  This is a group that could provide guidance on the 
intricacies of urgent need system deployment to traditional PM logisticians. 
Recommendation: 
 Maintain the REF logistics group as a center of excellence for the fielding 
of urgent needs to provide guidance on the intricacies of urgent need 
system deployment to traditional PM logisticians. 
C. SUMMARY 
DoD operates under mountains of policies, regulations, and oversight.  Well-
meaning statutes and regulations have become so complex and constraining that in many 
cases they become an impediment to the process.  Regulations designed to prevent 
                                                 
106 Cupernall, ―FAST: Field Assistance Science and Technology,‖ May 2006. 
107 Rochette, ―Field Assistance Team Focuses on Soldier Feedback,‖ 20 Nov 2008. 
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mistakes and fraud have created a zero-tolerance environment in which risk avoidance 
translates to higher costs, longer schedules, and poor decision making.  While painful, a 
comprehensive review of acquisition laws and regulations needs to be conducted to 
eliminate unnecessary regulations that have become obstacles and are not value added to 
the acquisition process.  One of the major goals of the review should be to eliminate 
waste and improve responsiveness.  In the case of rapid acquisition, processes need to be 
well defined and documented, and the acquisition workforce must be trained and 
organized to execute them efficiently. 
Changes to improve effectiveness and responsiveness are not without risk.  The 
problems that affect effectiveness and responsiveness have been identified multiple times 
and implementation criteria have even been defined by some; however, defining new 
processes and implementing institutional culture change in an organization like the DoD 
is extremely difficult.  The current DAS is the product of over 50 years of evolution, and 
even though it has it flaws, it has produced some of the finest military equipment in the 
world; but, external factors are creating new rules of engagement which are forcing us to 
adapt quickly or be forced to fight with outdated and ineffective equipment and 
technology.  The Army rapid acquisition processes, especially those of the REF, have 
given us a window into what can be done within the established laws and regulations.  
Additionally, the T&E community has been transformed by the rapid acquisition process, 
―(a)s a result of the war in Iraq and the rapid fielding required for some systems, the 
acquisition process is evolving into one that uses a more iterative approach, with smaller 
and earlier tests as opposed to the pass/fail operational test of the past.  Items will be 
fielded as tests are ongoing, and the results of that testing will be applied to the next 
iteration of the system to be fielded.‖ 108  
The pioneering and creative processes and practices developed by the REF can be 
lasting legacies that serve the needs of the Army now and into the future if we capture 
them and take advantage of them now.  The acquisition and T&E communities have an 
 
                                                 
108 Myles and Cast, ―Army Test and Evaluation Command Makes Rapid Acquisition a Reality,‖ 
September 2006. 
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opportunity to use the REF processes, practices, and lessons learned to bring meaningful 
change to our rapid acquisition system and position us to maintain our dominance on the 
battlefields of the future. 
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